


JOINTNESS: ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL?

BY

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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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ABSTRACT

The lack of discussion on the concept of jointness allows for misunderstanding of its attributes and obscuration of its meaning. This has resulted in abuse of the concept in the past and present. The exploitation of jointness has serious implications for all spheres of the military art: operations, doctrine, resource management, and force planning. This paper makes the importance of understanding the concept of jointness and its limitations evident. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the holistic and comprehensive understanding of jointness including its component functions. This thesis asserts that the pursuit of jointness in favor of one specific function will inevitably lead to diminishing returns and produce negative effects to the other functions of jointness unless a proper balance between them is maintained.



CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER	ii
ABOUT THE AUTHOR	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1 - THE NATURE OF JOINTNESS	8
CHAPTER 2 – CASE STUDY I: THE CANADIAN UNIFICATION ACT	20
CHAPTER 3 - CASE STUDY II: THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT	38
CHAPTER 4 – CASE STUDY III: DUTCH DEFENSE RESTRUCTURE 2003	56
CONCLUSION	80
ACRONYMS	88
BIBLIOGRAPHY	90
ILLUSTRATIONS	
Figure 1 JOINTNESS	11
Figure 2 U.S. TRANSFORMATION FROM 1998.....	50
Figure 3 CHALLENGES.....	54

INTRODUCTION

In some circles, jointness has become a virtual religion the tenets of which may not be questioned.

- Col. (Ret.) Mackaubin T. Owens

Introduction

As the wise ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius eloquently taught: “If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.”¹ The term jointness is understood in the military context as cooperation between two or more services. The capstone Joint Doctrine Publication for the United States Armed Forces, JP 1, defines the term “joint” as “activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate.”² JP 1 goes on to refine the definition in the following way: “The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces maximizes the capability of the force.”³ This definition of jointness emphasizes the benefit of cooperation as an increase in aggregate capability. In addition, the doctrine promotes the pursuit of joint activity is based on the perceived advantages derived from cooperation.

Although the Joint doctrine definition of joint and the reason for its pursuit seems unobjectionable at first glance, it does not contribute to a better understanding of the concept of jointness. The definition is ambivalent towards the different aspects and manifestations of cooperation inherent in jointness. In addition, the reasons that JP 1 offers for the pursuit of jointness ignores other advantages that come about through cooperation. An example of different manifestations of jointness is the level on which cooperation takes place in the organization (strategic, operational, and tactical) as well as the degree of cooperation (merely de-confliction of simultaneous actions or integrated, interdependent operations). An example of the latter is the potential economic benefits derived as a result of cooperation. Cooperation is economically beneficial as it allows for

¹ Confucius, *The Analects of Confucius*, tr. James Legge (Adelaide, Australia: eBooks@Adelaide), Book 13, Verse 3, <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748a/>.

² Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1 (JP-1)-Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Chiefs of Staff, May 2007), 1-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf.

³ Department of Defense, *JP 1*, 1-2.

efficiencies through specialization, as well as the elimination of duplications and redundancies that exist between cooperating services. While jointness may result in enhanced capabilities and economic advantages, these functions of jointness are not commensurate; emphasis on either one reduces the other to its by-product.⁴ The relationship between these two functions needs to be understood to prevent undesired effects. Unfortunately, the necessity of jointness in modern warfare seems so self-evident that a critical investigation of its tenets is almost an act of blasphemy with the U.S. Armed Forces not getting to the truth of the matter.

The lack of discussion on jointness allows for misunderstanding of its attributes and obscuring of not only its true meaning but also its nature. This has resulted in abuses carried out in the name of jointness in the past, illustrated in Chapter 2 on the Canadian experiment known as “Unification,” through to abuses in the present as demonstrated in Chapter 4 on the Dutch Restructure of its Armed Forces. In *The Use and Abuse of Jointness*, retired Colonel and prolific author Mackubin Owens wrote, “The abuse of jointness has serious implications for all areas of military effort—operations and doctrine, resource management, and force planning.”⁵ This statement is supported by the conclusions of this paper and demonstrates the importance of understanding the concept of jointness and its limitations. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to this understanding.

The research question

The previous paragraph mentioned the lack of clarity in the definition of jointness and to what benefit one might embark on its pursuit. Clear and consistent definitions for key terms are fundamentally important. This thesis assumes that the ideal type of

⁴ Maximizing efficiency within and organization will result elimination of duplication and redundancies between its constituent parts, making them interdependent and less capable of performing independently. Maximizing the capability of an organization means capitalizing on the individual strengths of the constituent parts and requires maintaining of those duplications and redundancies that the individual strength of the constituent parts depends on. Abolishing all aircraft within the United States Marine Corps and making them dependent on air support of the air force would contribute to efficiency but degrade the operational capability of the marines, decreasing the overall capability of the US armed forces.

⁵ Col (Ret.) Owens T. Mackubin, “The Use and Abuse of Jointness,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1997, p. 50-59, 51, <http://www.mca-marines.org/files/The%20Use%20and%20Abuse%20of%20Jointness.pdf>.

jointness seeks to optimize its results and outcome, assuring the benefits in one area while not creating disadvantages or capability shortfalls elsewhere. An optimal outcome maintains a balance between the different functions of jointness, preventing one function from becoming the by-product of the others. Jointness, however, is never an end in itself but serves as a means towards an end. Therefore its pursuit is almost always linked to a specific function of jointness in mind. This function of jointness, whether for political, military, or economic reasons, determines the mechanisms through which jointness is implemented. This thesis asserts that the pursuit of jointness along one of these lines will inevitably lead to diminishing returns. In addition, jointness pursued so single-mindedly can produce severe consequences on other aspects of jointness unless counterbalanced. The primary question this thesis seeks to answer first and foremost is: What is the nature of jointness? From this question, others naturally flow including: What are the driving forces for jointness? Under what circumstances are these forces likely to maintain a balance between the different functions of jointness?

Identifying the influential drivers for, and circumstances under which jointness delivers its effects or increase the chance on negative effects, is important as it enables decision makers to recognize and possibly prevent the possible pitfalls of their quest for jointness. Such recognition may also help military and political decision makers to better understand the military instrument under their control and its limitations. The case studies in this paper demonstrate the desired but also undesired effects jointness can produce, providing the argument for and simultaneously contributing to a better understanding of jointness.

Methods and Sources

This thesis investigates the concept of jointness through theory and comparative case study analysis. In particular, this thesis develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of jointness in practice. To properly address the salient points of the aforementioned, I trace and explore three case studies using a normative methodology. Clausewitz expressed, “It is precisely that inquiry which is the most essential part of any

theory ...It is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject.”⁶ This theoretical framework is developed in Chapter 1, based on a philosophical, doctrinal, and analytical investigation into the nature of jointness. The qualitative analysis is based on deductive reasoning and is supported by historical illustrations of where the concepts of jointness originated and how it has developed over time. From this baseline understanding of the historical context of jointness, Chapter 1 seeks to understand the constituent elements of jointness and how the concept itself can be influenced by external factors.

The analysis of the constituent elements of jointness in Chapter 1 draws heavily on organizational theory, including Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow’s *Essence of Decision*, as well as sources on strategy, policy, and theory including Colin Gray’s *Explorations in Strategy* and *Modern Strategy*. The discussions of jointness draw upon numerous articles on the subject in periodicals including *Joint Forces Quarterly*, the *Armed Forces Journal*, *Naval War College Review*, and the *Marine Corps Gazette*. One particularly valuable source for Chapter 1 for those interested in the subject of jointness is the U.S. Army War College’s selected bibliography on jointness. This bibliography provides an exhaustive list of references on the subject, as well as offers links to books, documents, and Internet resources. All these sources contributed to the analytical framework used to analyze the case studies, which in turn provide the evidence for this thesis.

To put the analytical framework to the test and analyze jointness in practice, as opposed to theory, this thesis explores three different cases of jointness. The first case study, contained in Chapter 2, examines the Canadian Unification Act, which was carried out in 1968. A study on the subject of jointness cannot ignore Canadian Unification as it was the most radical and comprehensive attempt to create a joint armed force in military history. The case study reveals how jointness was instrumental to a transformation of the Canadian Armed Forces. Most importantly, Chapter 2 assesses how the utilization of jointness, and how the program was conducted, ultimately contributed to its failure.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War, Indexed Edition*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 231.

The chapter on Canadian Unification is based on several authoritative sources. Primary sources include the 1964 White Paper on Defense, as well as several other policy papers among which is the parliamentary Final Report of the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces. A particularly valuable source for this chapter was the autobiography written by Paul Hellyer, entitled *Damn the Torpedoes*. Hellyer was acting Minister of Defense during the Unification and he was a key author of the 1964 White Paper on Defense which advanced the concept and its cause. In addition, Canadian Major-General Daniel Gosselin has written extensively on the Canadian Unification and his published chapters and articles offer excellent secondary source material, including insightful analysis of the strong service idea versus unification, which is instrumental to Chapter 2. Numerous other articles in magazines such as *Canadian Military Journal* and *Canadian Defence Review* provide additional detailed discussion of specific aspects of Unification.

The second case study contained in Chapter 3 focuses on the American example through the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act in 1986. The case study in Chapter 3 demonstrates how, and to what extent, the strongly divided and fiercely competitive and independent U.S. Armed Services transformed into what is now labeled “the joint force.” Jointness, which has almost become an article of faith in the U.S., is considered as a force multiplier and critical to recent and future military successes. As this chapter will show, the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act was instrumental in creating the conditions for this success. Goldwater-Nichols was included as it is a successful example of jointness, carried out with effectiveness in mind. Chapter 3 demonstrates *how* jointness is instrumental to the effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces based on the discussion of the factors and functions of jointness in Chapter 1. In addition, Chapter 3 shows how the interaction of contextual factors within the concept of jointness itself limits its full exploitation.

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act has been the subject of numerous books and periodicals. One key primary source for Chapter 3 is the text of the legislation itself. This text is augmented by James R. Locher, III’s outstanding memoir and evaluation of the legislative process contained in *Victory on the Potomac*. Locher has also written numerous articles on the Act and its implementation and Chapter 3 draws

heavily upon them all. His writings provide critical insights on the development of the Act and its results, from an insider's perspective, even if this means that his writings suffer somewhat from his proximity to the topic. Several professional military education theses have explored various aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These theses, along with numerous articles in journals such as *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *Armed Forces Journal*, and the *Naval War College Review*, provide secondary source material that enables a detailed examination of Goldwater-Nichols.

The third and final case study of this thesis is the transformation of the Dutch Armed Forces, which occurred after the end of the Cold War in 1990. In particular, Chapter 4 examines the restructure of the Dutch Armed Forces, which began in 2003. The Dutch case is included as it demonstrates the effects of another middle power pursuing jointness in the name of efficiency. Utilizing the analytical framework, the case study shows how jointness eventually turned from a useful exercise into a monster, which has consumed the capabilities of the Dutch Armed Forces. In particular, using the framework for analysis developed in Chapter 1, this chapter explains how contextual factors led to this unhappy result.

Unlike the other case studies there is no extensive literature available on the Dutch transformation or the 2003 Defense Restructure. Two primary factors contribute to this. The first is the relative recentness of the Dutch experiment in jointness, which has been carried out over the past decade. The second, and perhaps more important element, is the lack of scholarly and professional discussion of the subject in professional military journals, memoirs, or think-tank monographs. The main primary sources for this chapter, therefore, are official documents, which include defense white papers, policy papers, as well as Dutch-language news articles. One critical source for Chapter 4 is the excellent dissertation written by Rem Korteweg entitled *The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally*. Korteweg wrote on the subject of transformation in NATO in the period 1991-2008 as an International Relations student. He published his dissertation as a book and it provides valuable insights on the strategic and political context in which the Dutch transformation took place. Another useful source was the official publication *Krijgsmacht*, which contains studies on the organization and operations of the Dutch Armed Forces. These sources are augmented by articles

published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations as well as advisory reports from the Advisory Council on International Affairs. Although limited in number and scope, these thinktank pieces provide additional source material that makes possible a comprehensive evaluation of jointness in the Dutch transformation. The source material for this case study is mainly in Dutch although some English-language texts are used as well. In the event that a non-English text or remark is quoted, I have taken the liberty to translate the quote to the best of my ability.

This thesis ends with a conclusion that summarizes the overall findings of the investigation into the nature of jointness and its implementation in the Canadian, American, and Dutch cases. The conclusion offers answers the questions of when and under what circumstances jointness is likely to produce its beneficial effects. In addition, the conclusion suggests how to maintain a proper balance among the different attributes of jointness in order to avoid the pitfalls identified in the Canadian and Dutch cases. Thereby it will also validate and investigate the utility of the analytical framework. Rene Descartes wrote in his seminal work *Discourse on Method* that, “to divide all the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as many as [are] required to solve them in the best way” and to begin investigations “with the simplest and most easily understood objects, and gradually ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of the most complex”⁷ guides this inquiry. The conclusion ends by providing a number of recommendations upon which policymakers can act, as derived by this reductionist case study approach.

⁷ Rene Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.

CHAPTER 1

THE NATURE OF JOINTNESS

*Jointness has come to mean whatever the speaker wants; it's
nearly empty of independent meaning*
- Seth Cropsey

The importance of jointness for the successful conduct of military operations seems apparent. After all, when would jointness in military operations not be desirable? Although the term is commonly accepted, its apparently self-explanatory character prevents most people from giving much thought to either its true meaning or mechanics. A common understanding of jointness is obvious: military forces working together as a team, which has benefits, and enables the “joint team” to achieve objectives which would otherwise be unachievable by individual services. Yet teamwork alone does not guarantee victory. If the meaning of jointness is teamwork then it must be concerned with producing a winning team. The aim of jointness is not to “be joint” as an end in itself but as a means to achieve an end. This implies that teamwork or cooperation is only part of the meaning of jointness. This chapter investigates the deeper meaning of jointness, its purpose, as well as its mechanics. Only a thorough understanding of the concept of jointness and its nature will enable us to use it to our advantage and prevents its misuse.

ORIGIN OF JOINTNESS

Jointness is nothing new in military operations. Military history is full of examples of armed forces from different branches complementing each other in efforts to achieve their objective even if they were not labeled as “joint.” Thucydides tells us in 425 B.C. how the Spartans, defending the harbor of Pylos, were defeated at Sphacteria. The Athenian navy, working together in close coordination with heavy and light infantry, enforced a blockade while the infantry constantly harassed the defenders until Spartan will to resist was overcome. As a result, the Spartan army, which had been dominant on the Ionian peninsula for almost a century, was not only defeated but did the unthinkable

and surrendered their arms.¹ The benefits of collaborative action between different elements of the armed forces were understood then as they are today. This understanding does not mean, however, that collaboration is always practiced for reasons that will become obvious below.

Throughout history, military organizations have developed specialized services to fight and win in the land, sea, and air as war fighting domains. For much of known history war fighting was restricted to land and sea and operations between land and sea were known as “combined” operations. The invention of the heavier than air plane, which first flew in 1905, made utilization of the air as a war fighting domain possible. The unique characteristics of each domain required specific specialization, which led to very distinctly different organizational branches within the armed forces. These branches became independent services, such as the Army and the Navy, and these institutions within the armed forces possessed their own organizations, culture (including language and tradition), doctrine, and procedures. As warfare grew in scale and complexity, and capabilities like the tank, aircraft carrier, and long-range bomber were developed, these services became more specialized with the results that they created greater institutional barriers that hindered more close interservice cooperation.²

Despite the barriers to greater service cooperation leaders in some nations placed great emphasis upon it. During the interwar period, for example, the Germans successfully integrated airpower and land power into a concept of operations more popularly known as “Blitzkrieg.” The initial success of Blitzkrieg as a decisive method of combat, particularly from 1939-1941, illustrated that concepts of teamwork inherent in combined arms warfare doctrine³ was not only essential for success but could be decisive. Within combined arms doctrine, units of a particular size capitalize on each other’s strengths. Infantry, which are vulnerable to rapid and accurate small arms fire

¹ Robert B Strassler, ed. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1996), 240-244.

² For a good overview of the development of modern weapon systems, see J.F.C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1961).

³ Combined arms differ from jointness as combined stands for the cooperation between different branches within one domain-oriented service while jointness represents cooperation between different domain-oriented services.

and artillery, relied on organic mobile armored units, communications, artillery, anti-tank sections, and airpower to penetrate, shield, suppress, and provide mobility. The battlefield results of such units, including *Kampfgruppe* in the German army and Regimental Combat Teams in the US Army, could achieve were much greater than the sum of its individual parts. This perceived truth behind combined arms warfare became one of the drivers for today's pursuit of jointness. Operational jointness as it is understood today requires interoperability, integrated doctrine and procedures, and the willingness to cooperate. Establishing these prerequisites at the operational level, which are well understood, can be problematic to achieve at the institutional level.

RAND analyst Carl Builder provides one possible explanation for why specific military institutions do not seek greater cooperation with each other in his landmark work *Masks of War*. Builder explains how the differences between the armed services, and in particular their institutional insecurity about their legitimacy and relevance, often leads to behavior of entrenchment and pursuit of self-interest.⁴ Within the last decade, both the US Air Force and Navy have had considerable institutional insecurity related to their relevance to the mission of irregular warfare. The so-called "pivot" to Asia in the most recent strategic guidance issued by the Obama Administration in January 2012, combined with its de-emphasis on counterinsurgency, has led some within the US Army to question that service's relevance to future conflicts.⁵ Especially in peacetime, the leaders of individual services will try to influence the debate on military and national strategy in an attempt to make their unique service capabilities the military instrument of choice for politicians as they compete for budget to preserve their existence. Such competition between services influences cooperation between the services at the military-strategic level and makes it, at least in peacetime, very unlikely. Competition and rivalry also has an influence down at the level of the operational capabilities of armed forces. The services prefer to invest in the development of independent capabilities that fit the single

⁴ Carl Builder, *The Masks of War* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), Chapter 1.

⁵ The White House, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 2005), 2, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

service doctrine rather than developing complementary capabilities that would allow the development of a more integrated armed forces doctrine.

Service cultures and institutional behavior affected the utility and effectiveness of the military as a whole as an instrument of national power. Cooperation between the services was reduced, at its most basic level, to nothing more than basic de-confliction and learning to speak each other's language. Operations requiring a more genuine cooperation were often hampered by, or failed due to, interoperability problems. Great military failures, including the Spartan surrender at Sphacteria as well as the disastrous British and Commonwealth campaign at Gallipoli (1916), were the result of such interoperability problems.⁶ Some services, hindered by their institutional preferences and loathing of their national competitor, could only pay lip service to cooperation as was the case between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during the Second World War.⁷ The results of a lack of cooperation were in this case potentially decisive: "Had the Japanese army been willing to provide a proper level of support for the navy's expeditions and raids into the Indian Ocean and the South-West Pacific, the course, if not the final outcome, of World War II might well have tended even more favorably in 1942 towards the axis powers."⁸ The negative effects of such behavior influenced the military organization, and its operational and strategic performance, as a whole. The leaders of individual services often disagreed vehemently on priorities, strategic challenges, and the ways and means to address them even when they could agree on the broader strategic objective, as the discussions between the air, land, and sea service chiefs prior to the Normandy invasion illustrates.⁹ This inability to cooperate presented a liability, which limited the military's strategic flexibility, and utility as political instrument. Later in the twentieth-century during the Vietnam War, interservice rivalry could have a crippling effect on the utility of the military instrument to achieve desired political effects as H.R. McMaster suggests: "the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] were unable to articulate effectively

⁶ For a description of the campaign at Gallipoli see Roger Beaumont, *A. Joint Military Operations: A Short History* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 44–48.

⁷ Mark R. Peattie, *Sunburst, The rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941* (Annapolis, IL: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 126.

⁸ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 210.

⁹ Richard J. Overy, *The Air War 1939-1945* (London, GB: Europa Publications, 1980), 76.

either their objectives or alternatives. Inter-service rivalry was a significant impediment. Although differing perspectives were understandable given the Chiefs' long experience in their own services and their need to protect the interests of their services, the president's principal military advisors were obligated under law to render their best advice. The Chiefs' failure to do so, and their willingness to present single-service remedies to a complex military problem, prevented them from developing a comprehensive estimate of the situation or from thinking effectively about strategy,"¹⁰ as the renowned political scientist Dr. Everett Dolman understands it: "Strategy is confined only by the event horizon of possibilities, a horizon which expands anew with every action. A potentially unlimited panorama of choices may be revealed with the next moment. There is no beginning or end for the strategist: there is only more, or less."¹¹

The scale of increasing expenditures on the armed forces during the Cold War could be alarming to the polity. The ongoing development of the three distinctly different independent service organizations added to the growing inefficiency of the military organization. The services had their own staffs and their logistic organizations and processes were completely independent from the other services. This hindered cooperation but also resulted in overlapping capabilities and overabundance. More cooperation between the services would not only increase operational effectiveness but also allow for more organizational efficiency resulting in reduced costs. It was this rationale that drove the Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, which is investigated in Chapter 2. The promise of increased operational effectiveness alone was not incentive enough to overcome the institutional hurdles of the services towards more cooperation. Neither could the services agree on how the challenges imposed on them by the strategic environment should be addressed, which caused them to pursue their solutions, and required capabilities independently. This product of the fierce competition between the services became the trigger for the reorganization of the U.S. Armed Forces, investigated in Chapter 3 on the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. The lack of cooperation

¹⁰ H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1998), 328.

¹¹ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 13.

between the services affected the utility of the armed forces in a negative way, which provoked political leadership to intervene.

The political leadership imposed jointness on the military to solve its deficiencies. Unification acts, reorganizations, and budget cuts, as we shall investigate in the case studies in the following chapters, diminished the independence of the services and forced them to cooperate. Within military organizations, we now find unified commands, joint staffs, and joint forces. Doctrine for the armed forces emphasizes the necessity of joint operation and new procurements need to address interoperability aspects to assure its joint character. Jointness is now adopted as the *sine qua non* for effective military operations. However, as the previous paragraphs have shown, jointness serves different purposes at different levels of the political-military environment.

THE MEANING OF JOINTNESS

The origin of jointness is important as it illustrates its dependence on context for an understanding of its purpose. The preceding discussion provides us with three different contexts in which jointness operates: the strategic, the political, and the operational. The strategic context provides the rationale for the organization, equipping, and training of the armed forces to meet the challenges of the strategic environment. This also relates to the political context. The armed forces are not only instrumental to preserving the security of the nation but also an instrument of foreign policy and a competitor for the nation's resources. While the strategic context drives the question of what military capabilities are required, the political context is best illustrated by the question what the nation can afford to or is willing to spend on the military instrument to address the nation's security issues and support foreign policy. Both of these contexts relate to the operational context of jointness. In addition, both contexts require an operationalization of their demands, coming down to doing the best you can within prescribed limitations. These contexts give jointness its meaning and purpose. The next paragraphs will further explain jointness in its different contexts.

Operational context: jointness, the key to success

In its operational context, the focus of jointness is military effectiveness as the key to success. It means capitalizing on the unique qualities and capabilities the different

service elements bring to the battle by integrating them in a joint team, which is stronger than the sum of its parts. The main characteristic of jointness in its operational context is a certain degree of interdependence. This interdependence can be pooled, sequential, or reciprocal.¹² With pooled interdependence, the service elements operate independent but the possible failure of a service action threatens the success of others like in Operation Desert Storm, where geographical boundaries (kill boxes) separated air from ground operations. Sequential interdependence means the action of one service element is necessary for the follow up action by another service element. An example of sequential interdependence, also from Desert Storm, can be found in the air campaign prior to the start of the land campaign. Reciprocal interdependence is where the output of one service element becomes the input for others and vice versa. Reciprocal interdependence is illustrated in the SCUD hunt during Desert Storm where special operations forces on the ground and airpower mutually supported each other.

Jointness in the operational context focuses on command and control arrangements and the requisites for interdependence: education, training, coordination, interoperability, procedures, doctrine, and trust. These requisites are best explained by an example. Close Air Support (CAS) is an example of sequential interdependence. It requires skillful pilots and soldiers who are both aware through education and training of the interdependencies between them. They need to be able to communicate, which requires interoperable systems, and they need to understand the doctrinal concept of CAS as well as the procedure for its application. Trust in each other competences enables them to rely on each other. The challenge for jointness in its operational context is to prepare the service elements for interdependence without knowing the required degree of interdependence, the mission, and the composition of the force. The type of mission and the circumstances dictates the composition of the joint force and the degree of interdependence, as no two military operations are alike. Should reciprocal interdependence be the norm? Should the standard organization of forces be in joint

¹² James D. Thompon, *Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 44-55.

elements, along the lines that the U.S. Marine Corps organizes? These are the questions for operational jointness.

Political context: Jointness, or more "bang for the buck"

Colin Gray defines policy as "the carefully considered outcome of a rational weighing of costs and benefits."¹³ Therefore, jointness in its political context is about economy of force, maximizing military utility with as low as possible cost. The political utility of the military reflects the tradeoff between its effectiveness and its costs. For this thesis, effectiveness is defined as how well, and under what circumstances, the military can convert its capabilities into effects that support political objectives. Within the limitations of the budget, the military must secure the nation against external threats and provide multiple options to policy makers to exert influence in international politics. Jointness might create more options at the operational level of the organization as it provides additional options through combining service capabilities. Combining capabilities is also the path to efficiency and can be taken too far as Chapters 2 and 4 demonstrate.

The political leadership needs to balance between all state requirements of which the military is only one. The military must be able to support the political ambitions within budgetary constraints, maximizing the "bang for the buck." The more efficient the armed forces operate, the higher the return on investment. Cooperation between the services must enable that goal. Especially in times of tight budgets, service competition is regarded by political masters and others in charge of fiscal matters as the enemy of cooperation and efficiency. Service competition is considered a hindrance for making rational choices with regards to force posture and capabilities. The political leadership therefore enforces cooperation by attempting to reduce the opportunities for service competition through rules and processes.¹⁴

¹³ Gray, Colin S. *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 22.

¹⁴ Walter A. McDougall describes how U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara addressed both issues stated in this paragraph in 1961 by instituting his Planning-Programming-Budget System (PPBS) and, among other centralizing measures, the creation of a National Military Command at the level of the JCS "to preempt inter-service rivalries in operations" removing every vestige of independent authority.

The challenge for jointness in its political context is to balance between efficiency and effectiveness. To an outside observer the services within the armed forces might seem overly duplicated and redundant. The service's roles and missions are often overlapping and are able to produce similar effects, albeit from their distinct domains. Capabilities might seem interchangeable, raising the question of the necessity keep both capabilities in service. Duplication and redundancy, although perceived the enemy of efficiency, is often essential for maintaining a level of effectiveness. Redundancy enables the armed forces to absorb losses which would otherwise decrease its ability to project power or sustainability. Duplication often concerns capabilities, which the service considers to be essential that relying on another service for its provision would impose a risk on its war fighting capability.¹⁵ The perfect example for this is the U.S. Marine Corps that is often unwilling to rely on external air support, as it would impose the risk of degrading their ability to conduct operations. The questions to answer within the political context of jointness are how does one maintain the balance between efficiency and effectiveness, and, most importantly, who is responsible for doing so?

Strategic context: Meeting the challenges of the environment

Policy and strategy are sometime used interchangeably, implying that they are two sides of the same coin. It is true that policy influences strategy. Policy provides the guidance for governmental departments such as the ministry of defense and delineates the resources for the fulfillment of policy goals. Guidance and delineation, however, does not mean that policy is translated directly into strategy. The policy guidance given to the departments is often ambiguous and contains within it competing requirements. The policy goals need to be achievable within the strategic environment, which is subject to

Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 332.

¹⁵ The problem with having to rely on another service is not only the dependence that comes with it but also the problem of integrating an element of a different service which requires familiarity with doctrine and in integrated training.

change. This requires the armed forces to reconcile the demands of policy with the strategic environment.¹⁶

The strategic environment is diverse and presents challenges that are incommensurate with a “one-size-fits-all” solution. The challenges are seldom “domain neutral” and neither are the strategies to address them. The challenge is best illustrated by using an analogy. The Swiss army knife can be thought of as an example of an integrated strategic toolbox. Calling it a “knife” is a misnomer, as it really is a general-purpose tool, which can be used for a variety of tasks. None of the tools on a Swiss army knife, however, is optimized for any of its specific functions. Some challenges require special tools, specifically designed to serve one purpose and excel in one function, but with very little applicability in other functions. The utility of both tools depends on the context in which they are used or rather, the challenge they have to address. So while a Swiss army knife can be used to cut down a tree, the sawblade contained on it is more useful for saplings than more mature trees that are more quickly and accurately cut down using a chainsaw. Maintaining the right balance between general-purpose and special tools is essential to address the challenges imposed by the strategic environment.¹⁷

There is no such thing as joint strategy. Strategy matches the most advantageous (combination of) means to the desired ends and therefore its process is inherently joint in character. As Dr. Dolman expressed, “Strategy, in its simplest form, is a plan for attaining continuing advantage” to achieve the ends of policy.¹⁸ The challenge for the joint force, however, is to present the means through which strategic ends are achievable or supported. This requires an orientation on the strategic environment which different dimensions demand observance through domain-specific lenses. The strategic environment might require a dominant, domain-specific environmental-centric approach

¹⁶ According to Colin S. Gray, “[P]olicy is not an absolute, a given handed to military commanders on tablets of stone. Just as there is in practice a constant dialogue between strategy and tactical performance, as plan meets action, so there is a constant dialogue between strategic performance and policy demand.” Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 1999). 22-23.

¹⁷ “Most polities have some land, sea, and air power. The questions are how much of each do they have and is there a dominant geostrategic orientation for each of them?”

Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 22.

¹⁸ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 6.

or, due to changes in the strategic environment, require a shift in the environmental approach. Great Britain, due to its insular geo-strategic condition, has always been a maritime power, reliant on the strength of its navy, but was forced to shift to land power during World War I. Combat occurs in particular geographies. The ability to address these particular geographies determines the effectiveness of the joint force.¹⁹ The question that needs to be addressed for jointness in the strategic context is how the joint force reconciles the demands of policy with the strategic environment.

Functions of jointness

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the functions of jointness depend on the context. Within its operational context, the function of jointness is to produce the *decisive operational advantage*, which comes forth out the synergetic effects of the integrated capabilities of the services. Within the political context the function of jointness is to maximize the *political utility* of the armed forces by assuring it is the best it can be within the limitations of its means, and a close connection to political ambitions. Within its strategic context, the function of jointness is to provide and maintain *strategic flexibility* through balancing the force against its geostrategic demands. These functions of jointness inform us on the underlying elements that produce these functions and constitute the concept of jointness.

The functions of jointness are dependent on the balance between the concept's constituent elements. Jointness is about cooperation but this says little to nothing on the amount or degree of cooperation. A certain degree of cooperation should produce certain effects, supporting one or more of the functions of jointness. This points us to a spectrum of cooperation within concept of jointness with totally independent services (no cooperation) on the one end and totally integrated services (single services no longer identifiable) on the other end. It should be noted that both ends of the spectrum of the level of jointness are theoretical absolutes. The degree of jointness in the real, practical world almost always lies somewhere in between. The required degree of cooperation depends on which functions of jointness it primarily needs to support, leading us to the

¹⁹ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, 206-227.

elements related to the purpose of jointness. The functions of jointness capitalize on either efficiency or effectiveness. The purpose of jointness therefore drives its ability to function. Both purposes might be pursued but, as these are not commensurate, maximizing both requires careful balancing indeed. Figure 1 (below) provides a schematic overview of the elements of jointness and how they are related. The Figure illustrates that maximizing both effectiveness and efficiency requires the maintenance of a balance, as emphasizing one would immediately result in a decrease of the other.




Figure 1 JOINTNESS
Source: Authors' Original Work

The paradoxical nature of jointness

The previous discussion allows us in the following paragraphs to identify the characteristics and by that the nature of jointness. First of all, jointness is political in nature. As war is the continuation of politics by other means, the military is an instrument of politics. To merely possess a military is not an end in itself. In order for a military to have political value, it must serve a political purpose and have political utility. In the case studies presented in this paper, the polity has imposed jointness on the military as a tool to enhance that utility. This informs us on a second characteristic of its nature.

A second characteristic of jointness is enforcement. Jointness is enforced on the services for without enforcement jointness would not become institutionalized. The service's natural disposition towards preservation of independence can only be overcome by external pressure. "Because each service is concerned for its autonomy, a group of services is not likely to produce an agreed multi-service strategy or doctrine that does anything more than combine their independent service doctrines....In general, only civilian intervention can shake loose these inter-service treaties and jealousies to produce an integrated grand strategy."²⁰ This characteristic feeds the third one, which is contention.

Contention is the characteristic that gives jointness its paradoxical nature. As jointness is enforced on the services, it gives rise to the same contention between the services it intends to mitigate or ultimately remove. Cooperation is seldom an even split of the burden between the different team members. Like in football, some team members have a dominant role while others serve as enablers in support of the dominant team members. The offensive line protects the quarterback, allowing him to throw or pass the ball. The dominant players are likely to receive the most attention, the credit for success, and the highest pay. We only have to substitute pay for budget to understand why the services will try to carve out a dominant role for themselves even though their supposedly part of a joint force.

The fourth characteristic of jointness is its dependence on human interaction. Organizations cannot be made joint through integration of organizational elements or processes. Jointness rests on the willingness and ability of people to work together. Working together requires mutual understanding but also mutual respect for capabilities and perspectives. Trying to achieve jointness without addressing its human dimension is doomed to fail.

The external pressure of enforcement and internal pressures of contention between the services are important characteristics of the nature of jointness. In absence of enforcement and contention jointness would lose its meaning as it would mean the

²⁰ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (London, GB: Cornell University Press, 1984), 226.

services successfully merged into one single organization. One could call that "absolute jointness" but the term would be meaningless as it implies a dynamic which is no longer present. Contention between the services would no longer exist and with the disappearance of that characteristic the nature of jointness would alter. Should jointness go that far? Is the ultimate goal of jointness to make itself obsolete by effectively removing all competition and contention between the services, transforming it to a single organization? Should it? The answer to this question requires an investigation of the role of service competition within the armed forces.

The role of service competition within the armed forces

Service rivalry, parochial behavior, and service competition predominantly have a negative connotation. Yet despite this negative connotation such characteristics are also regarded a fact of military life in a number of historical works on military campaigns, particularly in trying to explain the lack of military victory in Vietnam. Ian Horwood, for example, describes how inter-service rivalry between the services within the US Armed Forces had significant strategic, operational, and tactical consequences for the pursuit of United States national policy in Southeast Asia and affected the conduct of the armed forces in Vietnam.²¹ According to General J. Lawton Collins, Vietnam reaffirmed the Korean experiences: "The old interservice disputes about command and control and close air support quickly resurfaced, with additional friction over the role of helicopters."²² As mentioned previously, H.R. McMaster describes in his book, *Dereliction of Duty*, the chronic inability of the service chiefs to transcend inter-service rivalry which rendered them irrelevant to the policy making process.²³ The existence of service competition seems to be the enemy of jointness, and by that provides a very strong incentive for its elimination.

When viewed from the perspective of organizational theory, service competition appears to be an inescapable, natural phenomenon. Within every organization, an

²¹ Ian Horwood, *Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War* (Ft Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2006), 177-191.

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/horwood.pdf>.

²² J. Lawton Collins quoted in Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953*, 178.

²³ McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, 114.

organizational culture will emerge, shaping the behavior of individuals within that organization in ways that conform to informal as well as formal norms: “The result becomes a distinctive entity with its own identity and momentum.”²⁴ Every organization is established as an instrument of one or several purposes which it will translate into a mission or mission set. The specialized expertise of the organization allows it to become an active player in defining just how various purposes will be realized in action. The armed forces may be seen as one entity but this entity is formed by three very distinct organizations with their own mission and capabilities to perform that mission. Each service sees its mission as essential to the realization of the organizational purpose.²⁵ Organizational theory therefore provides an explanation for service competition within the military as a natural component of organizational behavior of which the different organizational cultures of the services lies at its roots. The senior leaders of the services are a product of their service cultures but this does not explain entirely their actions. Another factor, the dynamic of governmental politics, is also a critical influence on their decisions.

The model of governmental politics provides an analytical framework for decision analysis. A central element of this model is the assumption that each of the actors in the policy game will have their own perspectives and their own interests. In the words of one author, these perspectives and interests play out in the following way: “Thus the service Chiefs of Staff, as the key players in the game of national military policy development, will have their own conception of the national interest, shaping their views about the best goals for the nation and how best to achieve these goals. Their actions will be shaped by

²⁴ Allison describes organizational culture as “the set of beliefs the members of an organization hold about their organization, beliefs they have inherited and pass on to their successors.”

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1999), 145.

²⁵ “The organizations influence the prioritization of purposes into a definition of their “mission” and are especially influential when the mission is translated, for a specific task, into more concrete, operational objectives. In that context, the organization may seek congruence between the operational objectives and its special capacities for efficient performance.”

Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 151.

the interest of the organization they are leading and what outcomes will be best for their organization, and to a lesser degree, their own individual interest.”²⁶

As competitive stakeholders in the process of security policy development, the services influence the development of defense policy and strategy. Such influence has produced concepts like “strong service” and “balanced force.” The strong force concept stems from the genuine conviction of service personnel and service senior leaders that their service best suits the national interest. This conviction allows promotion of one’s own service, even at the expense of the other services. The balanced force concept embodies the consensus model of the strong service concept. It allows the services to pursue their service interests under a “live-and-let-live” arrangement with other services assuring them their share of the budget.²⁷ Politically, the balanced force concept is attractive as it promises to maximize military options, allowing politicians to avoid difficult choices with regards to force composition. Under the balanced force concept, force development and defense spending are less products of strategic analysis than of available budget and defense technology.²⁸ An illustration of strong force and balanced force concept comes from the experience of the U.S. Air Force (USAF).

Early in the Cold War the USAF gained strategic dominance among the services for its Strategic Air Command. As the only service capable of delivering nuclear weapons deep into the Soviet homeland, until the development of the Polaris missile in 1960, the USAF dominated national strategy development and defense policy development. On the contrary, the appointment of General Curtis LeMay as Vice Chief of Staff of the Air

²⁶ Allan D. English and Howard Coombs ed. *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives—Context and Concepts* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defense Academy, 2005), 149.

²⁷ The strong service and balanced forces concepts can be linked to a nations approach to its security policy and strategy, which can take the form of either strategic pluralism or strategic monism. The former “calls for a wide variety of military forces and weapons to meet a diversity of potential threats.” The latter refers to primary reliance on a single strategic concept, weapon, service, or region. When a single service is permitted to claim an independently decisive role for its own strategic concept, the result is usually some form of strategic monism. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), 400, 418-27, and Thomas Owens Mackubin “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking,” *Naval War College Review* (October 2007): 111-124, 116-117. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/nwcr_owens_strat_thkg.pdf.

²⁸ This interpretation of the balanced forces concept is incorrect but presented here to illustrate how the notion of balance seems to present a reasonable approach. Who wants an imbalanced force? The required balance however is not between the services but between military power and its external strategic integrity. The concept of balanced forces is further explained in Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, 20-22.

Force in 1957 and as Chief of Staff 1961 reinforced the emphasis on strategic nuclear bombing. The USAF and with it Strategic Air Command (SAC) were generally pleased with its preparations for and performance in war. The perceived success provided little incentive for improvement, and most of the lessons in limited wars were deemed irrelevant.²⁹ President Eisenhower's massive retaliation strategy for nuclear war furthered SAC's ambitions.³⁰ As Crane states, "LeMay had completed [SAC's] organization[al] transformation into the world's most powerful striking force and had even supported the making of two more movies to extol its virtues."³¹

Moreover, the nuclear emphasis of the New Look defense policy of the presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged the USAF to focus even more on strategic nuclear delivery at the expense of other missions.³² The net effect of this dominance was that the USAF consumed the lion's share of the total defense budget leaving Army (USA) and Navy (USN) the fight for the rest.³³ Only by carving out a nuclear mission for themselves and heavily lobbying for the adoption of alternate strategies were the USA and USN able to re-balance the budget against the USAF. Arguably, the deterrence concept of the nuclear triad is as much a result of strategy development, to ensure a survivable second-strike capability, as it is service competition. This example illustrates the role of service competition in the strategic context.

Services will develop service theories and strategic concepts or doctrines to address national security issues. These doctrines may be self-serving to a degree but they also provide options to address real current, emerging, and future strategic challenges. Arguably the primary reason that Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote his famous *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* was to promote the navy. The same can be said of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell when they wrote about strategic bombing theory and the value

²⁹ Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953*, 175.

³⁰ Campbell, Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press 1998), 41-52.

³¹ Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953*, 175.

³² Horwood, *Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War*, 19.

³³ During the fiscal year 1954 to 1957 the Air Force received an average share of 47 percent of total defense appropriations, compared to 29 percent for the Navy and 22 percent for the Army. David Allen Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1969," *International Security*, 7:4 (Spring 1983), 29.

of airpower. These and other senior airmen were very aware that strategic bombing, if successful, would provide them with service independence. There is no reason though to doubt their sincerity in their belief that strategic bombing would deliver allied victory cheaply and efficiently. In the Pacific Theater during World War II, General LeMay, then Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command, applied a similar strategy on Japan, culminating with the dropping of two nuclear bombs.³⁴ After the war, the USAF believed its nuclear attacks represented the ultimate vindication of classical air power theorists like Douhet – that is, air power alone can win wars.³⁵ As a U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC) leader shaping cognitive structures, General Henry “Hap” Arnold announced in 1945, “[Atomic weapons have] made air power all-important.”³⁶ In an exaggerated and assertive tone, the USAAC “emphasized the strategic bombing mission, stressing it as the *raison d’être* for service autonomy.”³⁷

It is hard to imagine that a joint service would develop and pursue such a geographically exclusive strategy. Yet this has been the case up until recently. USAF Colonel John Warden, for example, did not envision a joint campaign when he developed his airpower theory, which became foundational for the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm. Based on the Douhetian notion of strategic bombing and industrial web theory from days long past, Colonel Warden described his Desert Storm plan “Instant Thunder” as a six-to-nine-day antithesis of Vietnam’s Rolling Thunder.³⁸ In the end, the air

³⁴ Conrad C. Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 5. One could argue that there was a profound difference in the approach to strategic bombing adopted in the European and Pacific theaters. However, for the context of this paper this difference is irrelevant.

³⁵ Ian Horwood, *Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War* (Washington, D.C.: CSI Press Publications, 1957), 19.

³⁶ H. H. Arnold, *Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War* as cited in Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), 293.

The air power operation Rolling Thunder caused many frustrations resulting from fundamental failings of the Johnson administration including “self-deceiving measures of effectiveness, and needlessly self-imposed operational restrictions,” in addition to unclear goals and objectives. For further details, see: Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 30.

³⁷ H. H. Arnold, *Third Report*.

³⁸ James R. Cody, *AWPD-42 to Instant Thunder Consistent: Evolutionary Thought or Revolutionary Change?* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press 1996), 40.

campaign lasted for six weeks and Warden's original plan was augmented with some focus on the operational level as well. Warden's notion that air power alone could achieve the political goals did not come to fruition.³⁹ Warden's vision was war won by airpower. These examples illustrate that a service centric outlook towards strategy is not without merit and, although self-serving, do ultimately support the national interests and national security policy.

Service competition seems to be an inevitable but also indispensable element within the armed forces. In his book *joint military operations*, Roger Beaumont wrote: "It is not wholly clear that the oft-cited functional differences between armed services in themselves explain operational failure in all cases, or that service parochialism is a universal evil. Tribal and psychosocial aspects aside, much of the distinction between services and nations has stemmed from functional differences arising from adaptations to specific environments and milieu."⁴⁰ The benefits of service competition however are more obscure than its perceived disadvantages. Policymakers in particular might therefore be tempted to emphasize on the negative effects of service competition while ignoring its positives. "In absence of a coherent strategy, non-strategic factors, such as bureaucratic and organizational imperatives, will fill the void to the detriment of national security."⁴¹ This is exactly what happened in the Canadian case, as will show in Chapter 2. Without clear guidance on the national goals, interests and objectives and a coherent strategy for their achievement, the armed forces have to identify these national interests and objectives, not to mention the strategy to achieve them, on their own. Neither politicians nor professional soldiers seem to be equipped to provide the necessary clarity on these matters.⁴² Discourse therefore is as inevitable as it is necessary.

³⁹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 103-152.

⁴⁰ Roger Beaumont, "Joint Strategic Planning: An Historical Perspective" Internet publication http://www1.army.gov.au/AHU/docs/Serving_Vital_Interests_Beaumont.pdf accessed 20 February 2012.

⁴¹ Mackubin Thomas Owens "Strategy and the Strategic way of thinking, Naval War College Review, October 2007, 1.

⁴² Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, 9. "There is little in the training either of professional politicians or professional soldiers that would equip them well for strategic responsibilities."

The political-military discourse on matters of national security policy, objectives, and strategy is best served by competitive ideas.⁴³ The strategic environment is not inherently joint. The world is divided in distinctly different geographic dimensions in which strategies have to be executed. To develop such strategies requires first and foremost excellent knowledge of the geographic dimension in which the objective of policy must be achieved. This necessitates an organization, which facilitates and stimulates the development and maintenance of such knowledge.⁴⁴ The challenge of jointness is to reconcile this necessity for diversity with the necessity for cooperation. “Politically, strategically, operationally and tactically, each of the geographically distinctive dimensions of war enhances the performance of the others. Indeed, the strategic challenge often is to find ways to transmute excellence and success in one environment into good enough performance in one or more of the others.”⁴⁵ The case studies in the following chapters inform how jointness fails or succeeds to address this challenge.



⁴³ “In this equilibrium, the need for competitive ideas at the center where decisions are made about the size, shape, purpose, and mixture of forces serves as equipoise to the demand for harmonious action in battle.” Seth Cropsey, “The Limits of Jointness,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Summer 1993): 72-79.

⁴⁴ The basis for effectively joint, and jointly effective, forces has to be forces that in the first instance are excellent in their own environmental domain.” Gray, *Explorations in Strategy*, xvii.

⁴⁵ Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* 19.

CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDY I: THE CANADIAN UNIFICATION ACT

No organizational scheme will create more from less or eradicate competition among strong personalities, but some types of organization can aggravate these problems.
- Douglas Bland

In 1968 the Canadian Liberal administration of Lester B. Pearson passed a law that eliminated the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Royal Canadian Army (RCA), and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) as unique armed services and forced them to merge into one unified military force. The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act, informally referred to as the “Canadian Unification Act,” is the most radical and ambitious military reorganization policy towards armed forces integration and unification ever implemented. The way in which unification was conducted, however, acted as “the genesis for one of the most divisive crises of civil-military relations in Canada.”¹

The Canadian Unification Act is an example of failure in joint force integration. Unification sought overall improvement of military efficiency and effectiveness and was thought by its architects to provide an example for other countries on how to address the organizational demands of the revolutionary developments in military technology and the challenges of the contemporary operational environment. Instead, the Act heralded a period of decline and decay of the Canadian Forces. The economic savings of unification were never realized, capabilities atrophied, and over the years a serious breakdown of morale and morals within Canada’s forces became manifest. The breakdown of morals is most evident, and can perhaps be linked to the trauma of unification, in the so-called “Somalia Incident” in March 1993 in which a Somali teen was beaten to death.² In April 2005, the Liberal administration of Paul Martin, Jr., released a new Canadian defense

¹ Major-General Daniel Gosselin, “Hellyer’s Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old—Part One,” *Canadian Military Journal*, vol. 9, no. 3, (Autumn 2009), 6.

² On 16 March 1993, Canadian paratroopers trapped and beat to death 16-year-old Shindane Arone for sneaking into their compound, presumably to steal. News of the incident prompted the Canadian government to commission the Somalia Inquiry, which would last for 16 months and resulted in over 300 recommendations for re-professionalizing the Canadian Forces. See also David J. Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto, Canada: McClelland & Stewart, 1996).

policy that planted the seeds for a major transformation of the Canadian Forces. On 16 August 2011, 43 years after their elimination, the RCN, the RCA, and the RCAF were reinstated as separate services.

The Canadian Unification Act presents a unique case in the study of joint force integration. No country ever attempted to unify its armed forces into one single force with one single identity. Although the unification of the armed forces was a failure, the long-lasting effects of the policy provide us with a warning on how a lack of understanding the nature of jointness may result in policies with unrealistic expectations. Such policies, despite their good intentions, might damage an organization almost beyond its abilities to recover and degrade its political utility to insignificance. An analysis of the Canadian Unification is therefore important for every policymaker who considers unification of its armed forces as a means to an end.

This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part explains the context surrounding the development of the unification act, followed by an overview of the unification's goals, its implementation, and its outcome. The second part analyzes how the unification act operated within its political, strategic and operational context, to identify the factors, which contributed to its failure.

The Canadian Context

As with any historical event, the Canadian Unification Act must be placed in its context to understand the circumstances that drove the motivation for the policy. The Canadians already had some historical experience with force integration. In 1923 Canada had a single Ministry of National Defense, which succumbed during World War II but reappeared in 1946. The Army had always provided dental and postal services for the armed forces and during the 1940's and 1950's medical, legal, and chaplain services merged. The Royal Military College became a tri-service institute, and military scientific research was clustered in one civilian controlled agency under the Military Research Board. Several supply functions were integrated and single service management was

applied to certain commodities.³ These were however relatively minor organizational changes, insufficiently addressing the rapidly changing domestic and military environment after World War II.

After World War II the Canadian military rapidly demobilized and, by 1949, had transitioned from its wartime footing to regular peacetime duties.⁴ The Cold-War however, tied Canada's national security policy into United States' security policies and Canada shifted from its domestic orientation and isolationism to an active role in international security issues. Canada supported the United Nations Command in Korea in 1950 and by 1953 also had committed forces to the Western Atlantic, to North-West Europe, and to North American air defense.⁵ This changed the focus for the Canadian defense establishment dramatically. The Canadian Forces, which had always depended on its mobilization potential, now became a standing force in being. This meant an increase in the overall costs of the military organization for personnel and equipment. The implications of Canada's more active international military involvement were not addressed in Canadian defense policy. By the time the importance of a codified review of defense policy was recognized, domestic issues had grown in importance and would heavily influence the new defense policy.

Domestically, the effects of increased industrialization, a greater desire to reduce poverty, and changing social values resulted in a growing support for government funded social programs. This emphasis on social programs had led to increasing budget deficits as one author notes: "The growth in the number and cost of social programs and their competition for funding against existing federal programs was a major factor in bringing the significant cost of defense to the attention of citizens and their governments."⁶ Meanwhile, persistent high inflation reduced the purchasing power of the defense dollar, necessitating an increase of defense expenditure just for maintaining its current spending

³ George V. Boucher, "They'd Jolly Well Better Do It: Has Canadian Armed Forces Unification Worked?" unpublished thesis (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War College, 1975), 2, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA009947>.

⁴ Lt-Col Ross Fetterly, "The Influence of the Environment on the 1964 Defense White Paper," *Canadian Military Journal*, vol. 5, no.4 (Winter 2004-2005), 48.

⁵ Ross Fetterly, "The Influence of the Environment," 48.

⁶ Ross Fetterly, "The Influence of the Environment," 50.

level. The Liberal Party, having been defeated in the elections of 1957, focused heavily on social policy for their elections campaign and was elected on this platform in 1963. With the defense budget, representing the most significant non-statutory federal expenditure, Paul Hellyer, the new Minister of National Defense, felt the pressure to reduce defense spending.

Hellyer goes to great length in his autobiography, *Damn the Torpedoes*, to explain that cost savings were not the main driver behind his policy of unification. He goes so far as to say that, “The cost benefits paled in significance compared to military necessity.”⁷ Hellyer puts a great deal of emphasis on military technological developments and modern conditions as the primary drivers behind the policy. Separate services, according to him, were an illogical relic of the past and he concluded that World War II had invalidated the old notions of sea, land, and air power as independent entities. None of these forms of military power would be able to avail independently as they now were totally interdependent. The main emphasis of Hellyer’s policy was not modernizing for its own sake, but rather reflects the inefficiency of maintaining three separate services.⁸

A primary example of the inefficiencies noted by Hellyer was the Canadian Forces management system. Each of the three services had direct access to the Minister of National Defense through their service chiefs. These chiefs were also members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, of which the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairman of the Defense Research Board also had direct access to the Minister. However, neither Chairman nor the Minister had veto power or authority over the service Chiefs. This construct allowed each service to pursue its own agenda and interests. As all recommendations from the Chiefs of Staff Committee required unanimous agreement, each Chief exercised a veto on its deliberations. Agreements, already watered down due to the process, bogged further down during implementation, as each required a tri-service

⁷ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes: My Fight to Unify Canada’s Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc. 1990), 41.

⁸ Hellyer was very influenced by the report of the *Ad Hoc Commission on Defense Policy*, commonly referred to as the Glassco Commission. The Glassco Commission Report, entitled *The Canadian Defense Budget*, arrived at some dramatic conclusions. Hellyer found the Commission “had recently done a splendid job of exposing the waste and extravagance resulting from duplication and triplication.” Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 36.

implementation committee to address the different practices and methods within the three services. This had resulted in over 200 committees at inter-service headquarter level causing delay, frustration, and in cases triplication of functions and effort.⁹ The management system was in administrative gridlock. Hellyer's goal was to fix this gridlock and he introduced his solution in the 1964 White Paper on Defense, which would become the basis for the Canadian Unification Act.

Hellyer regarded the existence of three separate services as the main cause of the problems within the Canadian Armed Forces.¹⁰ One way in which he addressed this problem was the controversial decision to replace the different service uniforms with one single uniform, derisively called by its wearers and others within NATO as “‘bus driver’ uniforms,” for all of the Canadian Forces.¹¹ He called the service uniforms “the visual symptoms of a deeply rooted disease—the existence of three independent and competing legal entities in an era when technology and common sense demanded one.”¹² The conclusions of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, the Glassco Commission, had in the previous year convinced Hellyer that his solution should move beyond jointness.¹³ In his white paper Hellyer therefore stated: “Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defense Staff and a single Defense Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defense force for Canada. The integrated control of all aspects of planning and operations should not only produce more effective and coordinated defense posture

⁹ Richard G. Ross, *A Paradigm in Defense Organization: Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Fort Lee, Virginia: United States Army Logistics Management Center, 1968), 19, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/679047.pdf>.

¹⁰ Although the Canadian Armed Forces is the official term created in 1968, they are more widely known as the Canadian Forces. For the remainder of the chapter the more common form will be used.

¹¹ Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass: Crime and Corruption in the Canadian Military* (Toronto, ON: Lester Publishing, 1996), 8.

¹² Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 36.

¹³ Minister of National Defense, *White Paper on Defense* (Ontario, Canada: Minister of National Defense, , March 1964), 18. “It is the opinion of your Commissioners that effective consolidation cannot be based on joint control by the three services with the object of preserving the traditional responsibility of the three Chiefs of Staff for the control and administration of all the Armed Forces.”

for Canada, but should also result in considerable savings.”¹⁴ The white paper not only addressed the Minister’s intention but also outlined the way to get there. On the specifics how the policy was to be implemented, however, the white paper was intentionally vague.

Hellyer’s elusiveness concerning implementation of unification was based on solid reasons. The white paper stated that, “To be effective, this plan, designed as a basis of development, must not be too rigid.”¹⁵ Hellyer’s first step was to integrate the services under a single Chief of Staff, which would be the start of an evolutionary process towards his ultimate goal, unification:

In the minds of some, integration and unification have been regarded as alternatives; in the minds of others two separate and easily defined steps in a process – two steps that were so distinct that there were no or little overlap between the two. Neither of these definitions is correct – except in a purely legislative sense. Integration of the three services began when the *National Defense Act* was amended in 1964, creating one Chief of the Defense Staff and abolishing the three separate Chiefs of Staff positions. Unification will become a legislative fact if the *National Defense Act* is amended to create one service in lieu of three services....it is difficult to define precisely where integration ends and unification begins. The whole process is a continuous complex program of interwoven steps.¹⁶

The first of these steps was achieved with the passing of Bill C-90, the National Defense Act in 1964. This step, however, instigated fierce resistance from the senior military leaders resulting in the firing of the Navy Commander, Admiral William Landymore. Landymore’s predecessor, Admiral Reginald Brock, had been forced into retirement previously over his opposition to unification, as had General Frank Miller, the first Chief of Defense Staff after the policy was announced. After the forced retirement of the Chief of Defense Staff, three other senior Defense Staff members resigned in protest

¹⁴ Minister of National Defense, *White Paper on Defense*, 19.

¹⁵ Minister of National Defense, *White Paper on Defense*, 21.

¹⁶ Air Marshal F.R. Sharp, Vice-Chief of the Defense Staff, in his testimony to the Parliamentary Defense Committee 1967 in Brigadier-General Daniel Gosselin and Doctor Craig Stone, “From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and its Present Transformation,” *Canadian Military Journal*, vol.6, no.4 (Winter 2005-2006), 8-9, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/trans-eng.asp>.

as well. These events stirred the opposition not only within the armed forces but also in the political arena, complicating the passing through parliament of Hellyer's second Bill C-243 on the Canadian Forces Reorganization, the Unification Act.¹⁷

The Unification Act came into effect on 1 February 1968. Minister Hellyer, who moved to the Ministry of Transport in 1967, had retreated from the political stage after a failed attempt to become prime minister. With his departure, other senior leaders within the government seemed to have lost its interest in the military. Without a political champion or advocate, the leaders of the Canadian Forces were left with putting the Unification Act into practice resulting in several reorganizations. The financial savings outlined in the White Paper never materialized and with the emphasis on social programs, military equipment was never modernized or replaced and eventually it ended up rusting out. For example, Canada scrapped its aircraft carrier capability without replacement and, until the mid-1980s, the country was still flying CF-101 (Voodoo) and CF-104 (Starfighter) as its frontline aircraft despite the fact that the designs were almost thirty years old. Operational capabilities diminished and the forces languished professionally and morale suffered. As a first step back from the unification experiment, separate service uniforms were reintroduced in 1986. By 1997 the position of the Service Chiefs were reinstated and they were returned to the National Defense Headquarters.

The Canadian Unification and the Nature of Jointness

The Canadian Unification Act intended to create a military establishment that would think and act from a national perspective.¹⁸ The mechanism for doing so was not cooperation, as the nature of Jointness suggested in the previous chapter. Such cooperation would integrate capability but still maintain separate services identities. Unification sought cooperation through a different mechanism, merger, which would require service identities to be abolished. Unification, therefore, is the idea of jointness pushed to its logical extreme end. The end result of unification is that the dynamic aspect of jointness, a degree of service competition, would cease to exist. As an experiment in

¹⁷ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 90-92 and 159-169.

¹⁸ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts," 10.

one approach to jointness the Canadian policy of unification failed. The individual services could not be forced into a single service organization. The Unification Act did affect the Canadian Forces organization for many decades after its passing through parliament. An analysis of its dynamics and how these operated in the different joint contexts (Strategic, Political and Operational) informs a better understanding of its failure and identifies the specific factors that contributed to it as the following paragraphs suggest.

The strategic context of the Canadian Unification Act was dominated by the Cold War and the nuclear threat it represented. The Cold War provided Canada with a well-defined threat against which planning could proceed in a relatively and orderly manner.¹⁹ Given the country's geopolitical position, in between the U.S. and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Canada was also tied intimately with the U.S.'s strategies. Canada had given up on its ambitions to become a nuclear power, recognizing the fact that it was the involuntary beneficiary of the deterrent strength of the United States.²⁰ This resulted in close working relationships between Canadian and American governments on defense issues.

In absence of a codified review of Canadian national defense policy between 1949 and 1963, the services developed their service doctrine, as they perceived best according to the operational requirements of their specific geographic domain. Hellyer was shocked when he realized this fact upon assuming the position of Minister of National Defense in 1963: "[A] critical point that disturbed me greatly was the realization that, wittingly or otherwise, each service was preparing for a different kind of war...this was the ultimate conformation, if any were needed, of inadequate coordination and joint planning at the strategic level."²¹

Service focus on their specific operational domains not only influenced doctrine. Canada was tied directly through alliances with a number of countries to guarantee its security collectively. Each service, however, approached alliance commitments such as

¹⁹ Ross Fetterly, "The Influence of the Environment," 49.

²⁰ George V. Boucher, "They'd Jolly Well Better Do It," 3.

²¹ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 33.

the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in service-specific ways as well. These service-specific approaches had allowed the three services to dominate the development of Canadian defense policy.²² The net effect of these service-oriented commitments encouraged the development of individual service capabilities, force structure, and war planning to the detriment of a true national defense policy.²³ The changes in the strategic environment due technological developments, and shifting perceptions on the liability of nuclear deterrence, convinced Hellyer change was necessary.

The service's emphasis on nuclear war was, for Hellyer, "near the bottom scale of probabilities."²⁴ Being aware of the American defense policy shifting from Mutual Assured Destruction to Flexible Response, Hellyer considered conventional encounters over a range of potential conflict far more likely. For example, he wrote in his White Paper that, "In the belief that adequate force through a wide spectrum is essential to the deterrence of war, it is the policy of the government, in determining Canada's force structure for the balance of the decade, to built in maximum flexibility."²⁵ The reorganization of the Defense Staff through the integration of the three services, and the creation of the office of the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), centralized decision making for defense, would create a military establishment that would cease to resolve problems and develop policies from a service perspective. The authority of the CDS, however, started to erode almost immediately after the passing of Unification Act in 1968 and was accelerated by the amalgamation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) with the departmental headquarters.²⁶

²² "For most of the Cold War, Canada's operational formations assigned to NATO reported via the Alliance's command and control hierarchy, followed NATO operational plans and doctrine, and took their orders directly from NATO headquarters. Peacekeeping contingents in this era were under the UN command, similar in nature to NATO. Other than in a domestic context, National Defense Headquarters had virtually no role in the day-to-day operations of the three services." Vice-Admiral (ret'd) G.L. Garnett, "The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level", *Canadian Military Journal*, vol. 3, no.4 (Winter 2002-2003), 3.

²³ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts," 8.

²⁴ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 34.

²⁵ Minister of National Defense, *White Paper on Defense*, 12.

²⁶ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts," 11.

With the creation of the office of the CDS decision-making was improved but the Unification Act had set a pattern for further centralization at National Defense Headquarters (NDHQ). Centralization resulted in the continued bureaucratization of defense in the 1970s and early 1980s.²⁷ As one author notes, the bureaucratization had a not-unwelcome political effect: “NDHQ became decidedly unmilitary in both form and substance. The liberal government viewed this as a positive development.”²⁸ Bureaucratization proved detrimental, however, for the strategic outlook of the Canadian Forces. For example, it led to the following state of affairs regarding decision making: “The overall direction of qualified witnesses’ opinions was that the senior decision makers lacked the input of sufficient expertise in the environmental areas (such as land, sea and air). The senior commanders of the three environmental commands were, essentially, acting only as advisors at the NDHQ because they had no final say in the decisions made.”²⁹ Unification resulted in the loss of single service perspective and expertise, which are vital to good decision-making.³⁰ The effect of this loss was enhanced by the fact that even before the formal passing of the Unification Act in 1968, its designer and biggest proponent, Minister Hellyer, had left the Department of Defense leaving implementation to his successor and the military. The implementation did not go smoothly for this reason among others as one author caustically notes: “In a decade, national defense drew seven ministers, three of them in a single year. Some awaited retirement; others had no prospects, leaving the Department of National Defense with a constant procession of ministers under a man more brilliant in debate than in decision making.”³¹ The governing political establishment within the Pearson and later Trudeau’s senior cabinet had lost its interest in the military after the departure of Hellyer, and showed little or no interest in addressing the need of national security due to its almost exclusive domestic focus. Those who did had the interest in seeing the needs of national

²⁷ Gosselin and Craig Stone, “From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier,” 13.

²⁸ Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, “The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification,” *Defense Analysis* vol. 17, no. 2 (2001): 159-174, 160.

²⁹ Ministry of National Defense, *Task force on review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: Final Report*, (Ottawa, Canada: Ministry of National Defense, 15 March 1980), 1.

³⁰ Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, “From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier,” 13.

³¹ Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, “Canadian Armed Forces and Unification,” 161.

security being met, the armed services, had either been removed or were ineffectual politically.

The Unification Act failed to improve the ability of the defense establishment to respond effectively to challenges within the strategic environment. Hellyer's assessment of the environment's demand for a more integrated military strategy, developed not from a service but from a national perspective, was not without merit. His Unification Act denied the government of the coherent policy advice on defense issues he envisioned to be its result.³² Hellyer took his vision with him when he left the Department of Defense, leaving implementation of his Act and defense policy development in the hands of those who did not share his vision and strategic insights. In the years which followed, "defense policy in Canada seldom originated from a strategic idea—a notion Hellyer had attempted to introduce in 1964—but, rather, it evolved from the dynamics of the annual federal budget."³³ The lack of detail in the 1968 White Paper on defense allowed the structure developed as a result of unification, which was intended to improve the quality of military advice, to become instead "a structure designed to ease political and bureaucratic burdens rather than promote military effectiveness."³⁴ The explanation why it developed in this way is found in the political context of unification.

Politically unification was appealing because it logically should increase the efficiency and utility of the armed forces at reduced cost. A tertiary political goal, in addition to efficiency and utility, was to reestablish civil control over the armed forces. A retired Canadian Brigadier General concludes that "The establishment of the office of the CDS was driven largely by political needs to address repeated weaknesses in the administration of defense policy and failures of the mechanisms for controlling and coordinating the activities of the armed forces."³⁵ Shortly before Hellyer became the Minister of National Defense, the Cuban Missile Crisis had sparked a domestic political crisis within the government of the current Conservative Prime Minister, John

³² Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts," 10.

³³ Douglas Bland, *Chiefs of Defense: Government and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 161.

³⁴ David Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 241-242.

³⁵ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts," 11.

Diefenbaker. United States' political and military leaders had asked for John Diefenbaker's Conservative administration for Canadian support of the naval blockade of Cuba. While his own political leaders could not decide how to respond, the Commander of the Canadian East Coast Fleet, Rear Admiral Kenneth Dyer, acted independent of political authority and deployed his ships for war.³⁶ On 30 October, after Khrushchev backed down, Dyer received direction from Ottawa not to exceed his annual fuel allocation. Because Russian submarine activity in his zone remained high, "Dyer turned a blind eye to Ottawa's indifference and kept his ships and aircraft at sea."³⁷ Establishing civil control was also necessary to enforce the unification of the forces, which would lead to more military utility while presumably decreasing the costs. According to Hellyer's reasoning: "The object was to establish rational military priorities, which included a substantial increase in air-transport capability, as well as additional sea-lift, as we moved toward more flexible mobile forces designed to meet the widest range of potential requirements with the fastest possible reaction time. This would only be possible by spending less on housekeeping and more on new equipment."³⁸

Democratic governments often have a short mandate politically which tends to install in them a preference for short-term gains. Capital procurement contracts usually come to fruition under the mandate of the next government, as is evidenced by the participation of other countries in the Joint Strike Fighter. Democratic governments therefore tend to favor making the most out of forces-in-being at the expense of future forces. As one analyst suggests, the forces-in-being approach is not without significant long-term costs of its own: "The result following a period where expenditure has favored current forces is that the average age of equipment has increased, the cost of maintaining that equipment has multiplied and the backlog of required replacement equipment has increased. This was the situation within which the Canadian government found itself in

³⁶ The Royal Canadian's Navy contribution, and Dyer's decision, are the subject of Peter Haydon's authoritative Peter Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canada's Involvement Reconsidered* (Toronto, ON: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993).

³⁷ Royal Canadian Navy, www.forces.gc.ca.

³⁸ Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, 43.

early 1964.”³⁹ Hellyer needed to reconcile the external pressure to reduce military expenditures, which endangered the domestic social security policies, with the internal pressure demanding increased funding which was necessary to maintain military relevance in support of Canadian diplomacy and to add substance to Canadian contributions to NORAD, NATO, and the United Nations (UN).⁴⁰ Despite Hellyer’s statements on increasing effectiveness, the basic purpose of his defense policy was the elimination of duplicate and triplicate functions and organizations, which would help him to control costs, free up funds to be spent elsewhere, and increase efficiencies.⁴¹

The efficiencies that Hellyer’s policy did achieve could not prevent the decline in overall purchasing power. In 1980 the administration of Conservative Prime Minister Joe Clark established the Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Forces under the leadership of George Fyffe. The members of the Task Force “concluded that the financial savings of the Armed Forces never materialized. They found it impossible to identify the aggregate savings that may be attributable solely to unification.”⁴² One stark finding of the Task Force was that gross expenditures on equipment had steadily declined and obsolescence had become common.⁴³ The armed forces had also become smaller in terms of available personnel due to reductions driven by efficiency. These conclusions only provoked attempts to increase efficiency even further, through centralization of resources, and privatization of non-core defense functions. Senior leaders within the Ministry of National Defense looked outside for advice on how to achieve even greater efficiencies. They sought advice from the private sector, and in turn, adopted business and management practices, leading to the situation in 1997 that “private sector management practices tended to dominate most defense processes, and an obsession ‘to do more with less’ distorted defense decision-making.”⁴⁴ Since Unification the Canadian Armed Forces have faced an overall decline in numbers of armed forces personnel, a

³⁹ Ross Fetterly, “The Influence of the Environment,” 52.

⁴⁰ Ross Fetterly, “The Influence of the Environment,” 54.

⁴¹ Major-General Daniel Gosselin, “Hellyer’s ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old – Part Two,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Volume 9, No. 3 (Autumn 2009), p. 9.

⁴² Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, “Canadian Armed Forces and Unification,” 167.

⁴³ George V. Boucher, *They’d Jolly Well Better Do it*, 7.

⁴⁴ Daniel Gosselin, “Hellyer’s Ghosts, , Part Two,” 10.

sharp decrease in percentage of the government's budget, and a near non-existent expenditure on equipment.⁴⁵ For example, in 1945 the Canadian Army alone numbered some 630,000 in uniform and by the mid-1990s the active duty component of the Canadian Forces had shrank "to below 60,000."⁴⁶ The efficiencies achieved by Unification, such as elimination of duplicate capabilities, were not enough to compensate the loss of purchasing power due to inflation. To improve its utility, without increasing the military expenditure, the Canadian Forces were therefore forced to eat themselves, becoming a hollow force in turn that had severe operational and strategic but not political consequences.

The dynamics of the unification in the operational contexts can only be measured by assessing indirect evidence on its influence on the operational planning and control, and operational capabilities of the armed forces. From the end of the Korean War until the early 1990's, the Canadian Forces participated in no real sustained combat. Deployments were often increasingly limited in time and scale. Although the shadow of the unification extends over the forces until today, its direct impact on operational successes or failures of the Canadian Forces has diminished over time. The period between the implementation of the Unification Act in 1968 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1990, Cold War scenarios dominated military strategic and operational thinking. As the roles and missions for the Canadian Forces were well understood in these scenarios, military professional development through education was buttressed in favor of the military training on how to stop the Warsaw Pact forces at the Fulda Gap on the North German Plain.⁴⁷ Because Canada never expected to engage independently in overseas military commitments, the Canadian Forces never fully developed the command

⁴⁵ Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, "Canadian Armed Forces and Unification," 169.

⁴⁶ World War II demobilization numbers are contained in Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass*, , 5; quote figure for the mid-1990s is from Department of National Defense, "'Canada First' Defense Strategy: Rebuilding the Canadian Forces," (Toronto, ON: Department of National Defense, 2012), available online at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/defstra/rebuild-rebatir-eng.asp>, accessed 30 April 2012.

⁴⁷ David J. Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair," *Canadian Military Journal*, vol. 9, no.3 (Autumn 2009), 33. A self-serving depiction of Canada's contribution in this scenario, outlined in a Canadian Army training manual that was subsequently published as a popular work of fiction, is Kenneth Macksey, *First Clash: Combat Close-Up in World War Three* (New York, NY: Berkley, 1988).

organizational structure necessary for effective command and control and to ensure coordination with government policy. This already had become apparent during the Cuban Missile Crisis but became even more prominent in the organization of the NDHQ. In the words of one author, “So long as Canada’s military commitments remained only a promise in the context of the Cold War, these problems remained hidden from the public. NATO and [Canadian Forces] exercises, however, revealed that the armed forces were incapable of meeting commitments and that command arrangements were flawed.”⁴⁸

The perceived increase of operational capabilities and effectiveness resulting from unification did not materialize. As a retired Admiral notes, “From a national perspective little joint training took place, and no joint doctrine existed or was even envisioned. Some combined training did occur, albeit outside of the Alliance context, primarily with US and Pacific based forces.”⁴⁹ Financial constraints further eroded operational capabilities as the authors of the *Task Force on Review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces* suggested: “Operational land units are undermanned, aircraft are in reserve because of financial restraints, and ships have been placed in reserve because of the manpower shortage.”⁵⁰ Ironically, unification created effects that were precisely opposite to its original intent: “The strategic rationale for the defense program became increasingly suspect, capabilities atrophied, and the national headquarters’ ability and interest in operational planning gradually disappeared. Officers, in effect had abandoned their corporate responsibility in favor of narrow and, usually service-based interests.”⁵¹ All these factors combined to influence morale within the armed forces in a negative manner which, as the beginning of this chapter suggested, culminated in the torture and murder of

⁴⁸ Douglas Bland, “The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces: A Troubled Relationship” in *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations*, ed. David A. Charters and J. Brent Wilson, (New Brunswick, Canada: University of New Brunswick, 1996), 33, <http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/proceedings/title.htm>.

⁴⁹ Vice-Admiral (ret’d) G.L. Garnett, “The Evolution of the Canadian Approach to Joint and Combined Operations at the Strategic and Operational Level,” *Canadian Military Journal*, vol. 3, no.4 (Winter 2002-2003), 3.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, “Canadian Armed Forces and Unification,” 167.

⁵¹ Douglas Bland, “The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces,” 30. Taylor and Nolan conclude that the moral erosion brought on by Unification led to a culture that condoned, or even embraced institutional corruption. See Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass* for details.

Shindane Arone in Somalia by Canadian soldiers that triggered a lengthy, soul-searching investigation of the Canadian Forces.

The Somalia debacle illustrated more than moral erosion but also pointed to signs of other maladies within the Canadian Forces brought on by unification. The first malady was the lack of unified command arrangements within the Canadian Forces. The senior Canadian Forces operations officer at the time of the deployment in 1992 stated that there was no command structure or operational plan because the CF only had "...An administrative concept of organizational and command and control"⁵² A second malady within the Canadian Forces was the breakdown of morale. The Task Force on Review of Unification already had reported in 1980 that the enforcement of a common identity through unification "was identified as a decisive 'morale breaker' and this was so much the case that they had noted an evolution back to separate identities for the three services had been permitted in order to overcome manifest low morale in the Canadian Armed Forces."⁵³ This was acknowledged in an assessment of the report, which declared, "The CF was facing a dilemma as a profession because civilian standards and values are displacing their proven military counterparts and, in the process, are eroding the basis fiber of the Canadian military society."⁵⁴ The enduring emphasis on efficiency and cost-effectiveness, however, would allow the operational capabilities to erode further until the Somalia incident demonstrated that its consequences could no longer be ignored.

The Somalia incident triggered a series of inquiries by several committees resulting in more than 300 recommendations for change in the Canadian Forces.⁵⁵ A government-appointed monitoring committee oversaw the implementation of the recommendations. Between 1997 and 2003, this committee oversaw the implementation leading up the transformation of the Canadian Forces, codified in a new Canadian defense policy released in 2005. Although the intent of the new policy is very analogous

⁵² Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts-Part Two," 7.

⁵³ *Task force on review of Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces: Final Report*, Ottawa: Ministry of National Defense, 15 March 1980, page 59, in Geoffrey D.T. Shaw, "Canadian Armed Forces and Unification," 168.

⁵⁴ Douglas Bland, "The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces," 29.

⁵⁵ David J. Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes," 36.

to that of Hellyer's 1964 White Paper, the differences in focus are informative.⁵⁶ Drawing on lessons from the unification experiment, the leaders of the Canadian Forces now consider it important to "establish the right mechanisms for the three environments to continue to exert influence in area's related to their unique expertise and competence."⁵⁷ Secondly, General Raymond Hillier, the Chief of the Defense Staff who led the initial efforts at transformation, "placed operational primacy at the center of his vision, the reorganization and of decision making in the [Canadian Forces]."⁵⁸ Hellyer expected loyalty to the Canadian forces as a whole, but his mechanism to achieve it, the removal of service identities through a process of merging, only produced discontent. In contrast, "Hillier's vision has been to foster this [Canadian Forces] identity as well, not through the wearing of a common uniform, but primarily through an operational prism."⁵⁹ A third significant difference is the increase of the defense budget since 2002, which is foreseen to rise until it reaches its top by 2030.⁶⁰ Although the new defense policy and General Hillier still assume the need for more integrated and unified approach to operations, the mechanisms for its achievement clearly reflect a different approach.

Conclusion

Hellyer went so far with his Unification Act to achieve jointness that he pushed the concept beyond tolerable or achievable organizational limits. Removing the service identities, paradoxically, is neither necessary nor desirable for improving military effectiveness. Hellyer's focus was politically driven, based on a domestic political agenda that demanded efficiency and decreasing costs in other sectors of government, the largest of which was the military. His personal conviction that this could only be achieved through total unification and removal of service identities made him blind to the consequences of his policy. His belief that loyalty to a unified Canadian Forces could be achieved through dismantling the services and introduction of a common uniform,

⁵⁶ Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier," 5.

⁵⁷ Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier," 13.

⁵⁸ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts,, Part Two," 14.

⁵⁹ *The Maple Leaf*, CF Transformation: From Mission to Vision," 19 October 2005, Vol. 8, No. 36, p. 7, in Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts Part Two," 13.

⁶⁰ David J. Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes," 38.

without considering the operational and strategic impacts it would have, proved both naïve and dangerous. While the resistance he met should have alerted him, it only contributed to his determination that he was on the right road.

In the final analysis one should not judge Paul Hellyer or his idea of unification too harshly. The reorganization of the Canadian Forces was needed in Canada in the 1960s and his analysis of the problem was correct. His solution to the problem, however, was too extreme and eventually became virtually an ideology. The net effect of Hellyer's faith in unification led him to turn a blind eye to the eventual consequences and outcome of the experiment as well as to ignore the true needs of the military. Hellyer pushed the agenda too far and created a defense policy of which efficiency became the rallying cry, one which would last until the mid-1990s. The concept of "Canadian Forces" as a whole is too abstract for most military professionals to identify with. In addition, the identity that service personnel derive from their service uniform, as well as unique cultural traditions and totems, makes attempts to change or remove it both a personal as well as an institutional attack. Hillier's strategy for the creation and maintenance of a Canadian Forces identity has been the exact opposite of Hellyer's: rather than break down identities, Hillier has sought to build up a new identity for the Canadian Forces on the foundation of individual, unique service cultures and identities. This overarching Canadian Forces identity is based on recognition of the nation and from the Canadian public for its operational achievements as a demonstration of its value, in order to inculcate a strong sense of pride and higher purpose. The core message of this campaign is being part of something bigger while remaining a proud member of the Navy, Army or Air Force. In the final analysis, and as the most drastic method of creating military jointness, "Unification proved to be too one-dimensional and overly constraining as an organizational model for a complex military institution such as the Canadian Army."⁶¹

⁶¹ Daniel Gosselin, "Hellyer's Ghosts," 14.

CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDY II: THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

*No other nation can match our ability to combine force on the
battlefield and fight jointly*

- General (US Army) John Shalikashvili

The United States military has an impressive, although mixed, history of success and failure. After its victory of World War II, the American military fought a number of proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam during the Cold War. The first was hardly a victory while the second was a nationally traumatic failure. The fierce competition between the different services seriously hampered the overall effectiveness of the armed forces in anything other than total war. The intention behind the National Security Act of 1947, which was revised in 1949, 1953, and 1958, was to diminish the influence of the services in general and create a more unified military force. A series of operational failures in the mid-1980s finally convinced some members of Congress that they needed to act on the problem. The result was the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, which was described by Congressman Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee as “One of the landmark Laws of American History.”¹ Today, the United States self-declared “joint force” is arguably one of the world’s finest military and one of the most integrated but this comes at a considerable cost. According to one estimate, the price of jointness within the U.S. military costs more than a billion dollars per day. Is its reputation as the world’s most potent military a function of its jointness, its budget, or both?

Many perceive the story of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act as one of triumphant success in the face of adversity and service intransigence. The Act, according to its strongest supporters, successfully diminished the detrimental influence of service parochialism on policy-making and the conduct of operations while preserving the service identities. One of the key policy architects of Goldwater-Nichols claims that, “The overarching objective of Goldwater-Nichols as it was ultimately formulated was to

¹ James R. Lochner III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn, 1996):10-16,, 10, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0513.pdf.

balance joint and service interest. It was not to thwart service prerogatives; the services were and would remain the most important elements of the Department of Defense.”² This objective resulted in a unique military organization. The elements responsible for the achievement of operational success, the Combatant Commands, are effectively separated from the services whose responsibilities are “limited” to the organization, training, and equipping of their forces. The services provide forces to the Combatant Commanders (COCOM’s) who are responsible for the integration of the forces into a joint force structure. Conventional operational successes such as Operations Just Cause (Panama; 1989), Desert Storm (Iraq/Kuwait; 1990-91), and Iraqi Freedom (Iraq; 2003) seem to illustrate the increased effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces after Goldwater-Nichols. The debate within the U.S. Armed Forces is no longer whether they should be joint but *how* joint they should be. Parochialism that is still influential within the U.S. Armed Forces is considered an obstacle for the progression of jointness towards more integration and interdependence. The preferred way ahead, however, remains balancing service and joint interests. The American experience with jointness seems to present a formula for successful joint integration and implementation and therefore deserves investigation in search of its critical factors for success.

This chapter first provides an overview of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, its cause, intent, effects, and outcome. The second part of this chapter investigates how the outcome of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act relates to the nature of jointness by analyzing it in its strategic, political, and operational context. The findings of this chapter contribute to an understanding of the utility of jointness and the factors that contribute to its successful implementation.

² James R. Locher III, “Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” *Naval War College*, vol. LIV, no.4 (Autumn 2001):95-115, 105, <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/744b0f7d-4a3f-4473-8a27-c5b444c2ea27/Has-It-Worked--The-Goldwater-Nichols-Reorganizatio>.

The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, An Overview

Before World War II, the U.S. Navy and Army³ operated almost completely autonomously in almost all aspects. The little coordination that took place was arranged through the Joint Army-Navy Board, which was joint in name only. One author has described how the Board worked: “The board prescribed ‘mutual cooperation’ as the favored method of inter-service interaction, disregarding century-old lessons on the need for unity of command.”⁴ The attack against the US at Pearl Harbor in 1941 exposed the weaknesses of this arrangement with the result that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt designed theater commanders to provide unified command. Roosevelt also formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as a means of ensuring effective Anglo-American military relations during World War II.

After the end of World War II the 1947 National Security Act institutionalized the JCS by creating a unified structure with three subordinate departments: army, navy and an independent air force. The act created the position of Secretary of Defense to head this new organization. The Secretary, however, had only limited powers and was at the mercy of the service chiefs. One author has characterized the problem the early Secretaries of Defense faced the following way: “In creating the position of Secretary of Defense, the National Security Act 1947 never specified the relationship of the new office to the service secretaries.”⁵ The Service Secretaries devoted considerable energy to advocating service positions, often at the expense of the Defense Secretary’s broader agenda. The unified commanders also lacked authority as the chiefs empowered the service component commanders, resulting in unified commands, which were unified in name only. The chiefs operated on the principle of veto and the Chairman had no authority to enforce a decision: “Things would proceed when the chiefs could come to unanimous agreement—which often required watering down their collective advice.”⁶

³ The US Air Force, which was originally part of the US Army, would achieve its independence as a separate service as part of the 1947 National Security Act. For details, see Walton Moody, *Building a Strategic Air Force* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995), Chapters II-VII.

⁴ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 18.

⁵ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac*, 11.

⁶ James R. Locher III, “Has it Worked?,” 97.

Poor military advice, a lack of interest in defense strategy other than single-service oriented, weak unified commands unable to integrate the service elements into an effective operational force, and inefficiencies were the main deficiencies within the U.S. Armed Forces in the years prior to Korea. Three revisions of the act from 1947 to 1958 could not repair these deficiencies and these would continue to hamper the organization until the 1980's when Congress finally decided to step in.

The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986 would put an end to the domination of the individual services over the integration of their capabilities within the unified command. Those within Congress were shocked by service chiefs putting the requirements of their own service above those of the mission during Operations Eagle Claw (the failed attempt to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran in 1980) and Urgent Fury (Grenada, 1983). Congressmen such as Sam Nunn (D-GA) “focused on the excessive power and influence of the four services, which had precluded the integration of their separate capabilities for war fighting.”⁷ The Act would also improve the nature of military advice and strengthen civilian authority in the following way: “The central provision of the law was to designate the JCS Chairman as the principal military adviser to the civilian leadership, freeing him from the need to achieve consensus among the service chiefs.”⁸ In total the provisions in the Act were designed to: strengthen civil authority; improve military advice; clarify responsibilities, especially for the unified and specified commands, and ensure the authority meets up with this responsibility; increase attention to strategy; provide more efficient use of defense resources; improve joint officer management policies; enhance effectiveness of military operations; and improve DoD management and administration.⁹ The campaign to reform DoD, culminating in Goldwater-Nichols, took four years and 241 days and met fierce opposition politically and from the services during that period. The campaign

⁷ James. R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996, page 10.

⁸ Thomas Donnelly, “What Lies “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols”?”, American enterprise Institute for Public Policy research, March 2008, page 4

⁹ Congress House, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Conference Report*, 99th Cong., 2d sess., Report 99-824, sec. 3.

resulted in a significantly detailed piece of legislation, one that mandated reforms necessary without leaving much room for interpretation to ensure its desired effects.

Most observers suggest that Goldwater-Nichols achieved its main purpose. For example, one author involved in the process, James R. Locher III, concludes that, “It is now widely agreed that Goldwater-Nichols has achieved its objective of balancing the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders.”¹⁰ Another writer, Christopher Bourne, adds that, “The law increased cooperation and interoperability between the services, improved professional military education, and unified the national military command structure.”¹¹

Goldwater-Nichols, however, did not achieve all of its stated objectives outlined above. For example, it “failed in its objectives of strengthening civilian authority and improving military advice to the president.”¹² In addition, the Act created other problems: “The President should not be bound by laws that intrude on his constitutional role. But Goldwater-Nichols does just that by prescribing how to organize the military, communicate with subordinates, and consult in developing implementing orders and directives and by dictating who to appoint as subordinate commanders.”¹³ Several other successes of Goldwater-Nichols are subjected to critique.

One of the primary triumphs of Goldwater-Nichols was the establishment of the Chairman of the JSC as the principal military advisor to the civilian leadership. Now the Armed Services would speak with one voice in matters that sought to apply military means against policy ends: “The Goldwater-Nichols Act has increased attention to both strategy making and contingency planning. The quality of strategy documents has varied, but in every case their value has been superior to their pre-Goldwater-Nichols predecessors.”¹⁴ In solving, the problem of unifying military advice another problem of civil-military relations has been created: “Limiting the diversity of advice offered to responsible civilian authority facilitates decision-making but reduces the practical

¹⁰ James. R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 13.

¹¹ Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1998):99-108, 100, http://www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1818.pdf.

¹² Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences,” 102.

¹³ Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences,” 103.

¹⁴ James. R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 14.

exercise of civilian control.”¹⁵ Goldwater-Nichols diminished the influence of the services on policy and strategy development within the organization but that did not diminish their interests. “The Chiefs, who remain responsible under Title 10 for organizing, training, and equipping of the armed forces, have responded to their diminishing influence by shaping congressional opinion from the outside. The services have consequently become more politicized.”¹⁶ There is also doubt whether recent military success must be attributed to the increased level of jointness. The overwhelming success of Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm, often referred to as evidence for the increase of operational effectiveness through unified effort,¹⁷ is not generally accepted. One author commented on these operations, “A more nuanced view would have noted that the services did not so much cooperate as fight separate wars.”¹⁸ Shortly after Desert Storm, the former British Air Secretary Marshal Mason “called for a stern exorcism of the sort of air power excessiveness that was reflected in the exaggerated claims of Giulio Douhet.”¹⁹ However, the USAF leadership did not abandon their paradigm. According to Manson, Desert Storm was “a result of strategic, operational and tactical simultaneous synergism, not from any reincarnation of Douhet.”²⁰ Mason postulated that to limit the number of exaggerated claims, an assessment of air power’s effectiveness should “emphasize not just [air powers] unique characteristics, but the feature it shares ... with other forms of warfare. [The preeminence of air power] will stand or fall not by promises and abstract theories, but, like any other kind of military power, by its relevance to, and ability to secure, political objectives at a cost acceptable to the government.”²¹ General Tommy Franks, former Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and architect of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division during Desert Storm called DESERT STORM,

¹⁵ Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences,” 103.

¹⁶ Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences,” 107.

¹⁷ James. R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 15.

¹⁸ Thomas Donnelly, “What Lies “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols”?,” 4.

¹⁹ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 313-314.

²⁰ Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 314.

²¹ Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason as quoted in Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, 314.

“a patchwork of ‘deconflicted’ service operations, not a true joint effort.”²² A review of the national security apparatus in 2004 indicated some other weaknesses.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies reviewed the national security apparatus in search for recommendations to meet the challenge of the post Cold War, and post 9/11 security environment, and presented their report in 2004. The researchers found within DoD “hidden failures that, while not preventing operational success, stifle necessary innovation and continue to squander critical resources in terms of time and money,”²³ Hidden failures remain the poor connection between finite resources, and shifting priorities to program decisions and budgeting, which hampers strategic planning. This hampers the building of joint capabilities. A stronger role in the resource allocation process for the component commander would be an improvement. Interestingly, the researchers based their recommendations on the premise that defense resources should continue to be organized, managed, and budgeted along service lines. “The Military Services remain the best source for coherent and integrated budgets within their respective domains and are increasingly coordinating allocation structures to compensate for the inter-service seams.”²⁴ This premise implicitly acknowledges balancing between service interests and joint interest as the preferred model joint development. Despite the critique, the U.S. Armed Forces regard themselves as “The Joint Force.”

In his speech before the Senate Armed Services Committee in September 2010, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the committee on the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). This organization was stood up in 1999 to be a driver for jointness and was now disestablished as “Jointness is difficult to measure, but the goal of embracing joint operations and doctrine has reached a point where a four-star headquarters for joint advocacy is no longer required. We have embraced jointness as a matter of necessity. Evidence of this is manifested on the battlefield and in our military school. We have reached critical mass, where our military

²² Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York, NY: Regan Books, 2005), 379.

²³ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols—Defense Reform for a New Strategic Area-Phase 1 Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 6, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf.

²⁴ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols-Phase 1 Report*, 6.

accepts “joint” as the preferred method of war.”²⁵ This preference comes with a risk. A resident fellow of the American Enterprise Institute for public Policy Research asserts: “Goldwater-Nichols is taken as the paradigm of military effectiveness. Joint operations have become almost an end in themselves, and they have given birth to a whole new body of doctrine and requirements for every aspect of military affairs.”²⁶ For some however, the jointness within the U.S. Armed Forces is not going far enough and advocates further integration and interdependence. Marine Corps Lieutenant General (Ret) Trainor asserts that interdependence should be the goal for the joint force as “services capable of semi-autonomous action are inclined to go their own way if circumstances allow.”²⁷ So, are the U.S. Armed Forces after Goldwater-Nichols joint, not joint, too joint, or all three?

A student of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) assigned to the Pentagon after his graduation made the following observation:

First, I could not appreciate how non-Joint the Pentagon is, intentionally, before coming here for the first time. Logic would seem to make one think that such an approach is inefficient, but it's no mistake that Goldwater-Nichols made the combatant commands Joint, while retaining the adversarial Service structure for organizing, training, and equipping. America's Constitution's framers were Machiavellian, reflected in our adversarial legal system in which two parties aggressively present facts in the most slanted and partisan way from which an impartial judge or jury attempts to ferret out justice. The defense budget process operates similarly. Congress and the White House, whose ranks are disproportionately drawn from lawyers, expect that the Services will present their budget proposals in the most favorable light just as opposing attorneys would. Congress then, the impartial jury, is responsible for determining where the reasonable middle ground lies. The paradox, and most frustrating aspect of this systemic structure, is that reasonable, balanced outcomes for the Nation *depend* on vigorous, Service parochial, non-Joint advocacy. To use an imperfect but apropos analogy, defense

²⁵ Senate, *Statement of General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Tuesday, September 28th, 2010, , <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/09%20September/Cartwright%2009-28-10.pdf>.

²⁶ Thomas Donnelly, “What Lies “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols”?”, 4.

²⁷ Bernard E. Trainor, “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War”, *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Winter 1993-1994):71-74, 74, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1403.pdf>.

budgeting is a prisoner's dilemma, where the stable solution is every Service defects.²⁸

If this observation is correct, than Goldwater-Nichols implemented a structure commensurate with the nature of jointness. The remainder of this chapter will analyze the jointness of the U.S. Armed Forces in its strategic, political, and operational context to verify this assumption and identify the prerequisites which allow it to function.

Goldwater-Nichols and the Nature of Jointness

Before World War II, the United States strategic outlook was largely isolationist in nature. With the Atlantic Ocean in the East and the Pacific in the West, the United States only required coastal defenses for its security and had no need for a large standing armed force. The absence of natural enemies and the limited foreign interest caused the United States to be strategically indifferent. After World War II this dramatically changed. Communism opposed the free market system the United States perceived as the enabler for peace and prosperity, and endangered a recovering Europe. Soviet expansionism needed to be contained, and communism defeated. The U.S. national interest, and security interests, would come to depend on its ability to understand and influence its strategic environment, which now encompassed the whole world. Suddenly, while before World War II always on a tight leash, the U.S. Armed Services found themselves at the center of national security strategy and defense policy. Empowered by the National Security Act 1947, the service chiefs would pursue service interests in the name of national security. The strategic environment allowed them to link their service strengths to security challenges favorable for their service while ignoring the challenges less favorable for their purpose. This practice severely hampered the ability of the JCS to agree on matters of military strategy and policy and made them ineffective. The result was the absence of a consistent national strategy. Former Deputy Assistant for National Security (2003-2005), Aaron Friedberg, commented: “The United States has had a strategic doctrine in the same way that a schizophrenic has a personality. Instead of a single integrated and integrating set of ideas, values, and beliefs, we have had a complex

²⁸ E-mail to Colonel Timothy P. Schultz, Commander SAASS, 19 January 2012.

and sometimes contradictory mélange of notions, principles, and policies.”²⁹ Goldwater-Nichols intended to end this situation but the U.S. strategic environment and the need to maintain the ability to address the challenges it imposes does not allow rigorous change.

Within the strategic context, jointness must preserve and expand the armed forces flexibility and adaptability to meet the challenges of the strategic environment. It has to do so within the existing fiscal realities. The absence of a coherent national security strategy prohibited civil authorities to assess the military budget and requirements. “The Nation was formulating security strategy unconstrained by realistic estimates of available resources, because the services could never agree on a fiscally constrained strategy and the allocation of resources to support it. Communications, refueling, and other vital systems and devices were not interoperable across the services. There were modernization/readiness imbalances, because the all-powerful services were pushing for more modernization, while the readiness needs of the weak unified commanders were underrepresented.”³⁰ Denying the fiscal realities of the nation did not serve national interest “A strategy whose goals far exceed resources available for their implementation is a recipe for potential disaster.”³¹ Congress, through an amendment to Goldwater-Nichols, sought therefore to correct deficiencies in general strategic planning and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) by requiring the president to submit to congress an annual National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) outlining the national security strategy the commander in chief will pursue while in office.³² This backfired however as soon as President Reagan fulfilled his obligation to congress with his NSSR in 1987 in which he made congress aware of the fact that “While a president may judge the adequacy of U.S. capabilities to fund his efforts as both possible and

²⁹ Aaron Friedberg, “The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Doctrine,” in *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies For American Security*, ed. Samuel P. Huntington (Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger Pub Co, 1982), 56.

³⁰ James R. Locher III, “Has it Worked?,” 101.

³¹ David Isenberg, *Missing the Point: Why the Reforms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Won’t Improve U.S. Defense Policy*, (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, Policy Analysis no. 100, February, 1988), <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa100.pdf>.

³², *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1986*, 99th Congress, Public Law 99-433 1. October 1986. The Clause four of the law’s requirements for the content of the NSSR states: “The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.”

reasonable, Congress may disagree and therefore nullify his efforts.”³³ The message was clear, the president might be accountable for the strategy but Congress could be held accountable for its failure. This contributed to the power of the Chief Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The JCS provided the primary input to the strategic planning process through the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), which contains force structure recommendations. The JCS were never able to provide these recommendations within existing resource constraints.³⁴ Goldwater-Nichols shifted responsibility for the JSPD to the Chairman, as this would enable him to provide a joint assessment free from service interest driven influences. In practice, however, this expectation has not been met and the services have continuously been able to link service doctrine to the strategic environment while ignoring joint capabilities. “While recent decades have shown remarkable improvements in developing war fighting concepts and in planning for and executing joint warfare, they have not shown the same progression, if any at all, in creating truly ready joint forces in peacetime nor in rationalizing the services future capabilities related to joint warfare needs.”³⁵ Only budget constraints will enforce more jointness.

The strategic context of the U.S. Armed Forces and the emphasis of the United States on its military instrument of power in foreign policy enable the services to pursue service interests and capabilities. The complexity of the strategic environment allows every service to successfully argue the relevance of its doctrine and necessity of capabilities. The relevance of the U.S. Armed Forces for the national strategy does not allow risky experiments, which might degrade its effectiveness. The increasing costs of technology and the increasing costs of maintaining the force, however, necessitate more emphasis on efficiency to control the expenditures on defense. Jointness then becomes a means for service survival as was illustrated in the statement of Vice Admiral Konetzi in

³³ Matthew Baldwin and Senior Honors, *In Search of U.S. Grand Strategy, National Security Strategy since Goldwater-Nichols* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 2003), 38, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03baldwin.pdf>.

³⁴ David Isenberg, *Missing the Point*, 7.

³⁵ Don M. Snider, “Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession,” *Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly*, , vol 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003):17-30, 18, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486430>.

2004; “True jointness will be necessary for the navy to be able to continue to meet its commitments. If jointness is not achieved, then the Navy will go on with non-interoperable systems for which the Navy will have to pay much more.”³⁶ Air Force Lt Gen (Ret) David Deptula stated at a Center for Naval Analysis conference in 2011: “It’s time our security architectures move forward to better integrate functions and capabilities across service lines while simultaneously eliminating unneeded redundancies, yet retaining the separateness of the functions of the services that is really the linchpin of jointness.”³⁷ While effectiveness dominates the strategic context, the political context demands control of the expenditure of the armed forces, emphasizing the efficiency function of jointness. How well enables Goldwater-Nichols the United States Polity to maximize the bang for the buck?

To understand how jointness operates within the United States’ political context one needs to understand the American governmental system with its shared responsibilities, intended to prevent the government to become too powerful. “The framers of the constitution granted the office of Commander in Chief to the President rather than the function of commander, allowing him to order the forces provided by congress but not to determine their size of composition. They intended that the President should not enjoy the political and military powers of a European ruler and observed George Mason’s warning that the purse and sword should not fall into the same hands.”³⁸ The responsibility for the allocation of resources and structure of the armed forces is with the Congress. Because of this, these subjects have become heavily politicized. Members of Congress represent their constituencies who elect and re-elect their representative on his ability to protect their interests. Military procurement projects represent billion dollar contracts for defense industry, which allows the creation of jobs and stimulate state

³⁶ Adm. Konetzi, deputy commander and chief of staff, U.S. Atlantic Fleet at West 2004. Annual conference and exposition sponsored by AFCEA International and the Naval Institute as quoted in Robert K. Ackerman, “Jointness Remains An Elusive Target,” *Signal Magazine* (May 2004), 4, http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=138&zoneid=8.

³⁷ Lt Gen USAF (Ret) Dave Deptula, , “Jointness, Grand Strategy, and the Emerging Security Environment: An Airman’s Perspective,” in *American Grand Strategy and Sea Power Conference Report* (Washington, DC: Army and Navy Club, 4 August 2011):83-90, <http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/CNApart.pdf>.

³⁸ Christopher M. Bourne, “Unintended Consequences,” 100.

economy. Military bases, housing thousands of families, stimulate local economies as well. For this reason, Congress has been opposing defense reform, aiming at strengthening authority, for decades. “Where ships were to be built, where battalions would be posted, where jobs would be created; Congress would have more bargaining leverage vis-à-vis a military establishment in which authority was diffused.”³⁹

Goldwater-Nichols strengthened authority but did not change this dynamic. The service chiefs, who lost their veto within the JCS and authority to the combatant commanders, were expected to think joint when providing advice on resources and force structure. As they remained double hatted, this expectation was not realistic. “Expecting the chiefs, who are required by law to organize, train, and equip forces, to cut programs or personnel when they also represent service interests are unrealistic. Even when the chiefs provide truly joint advice on recourse issues, the political leadership will often discount their recommendations.”⁴⁰ Due to the typical dynamics of the U.S. political environment the efficiency function of jointness is difficult to leverage. This inability to capitalize the efficiency function of jointness prevents effective control of expenditure and, unless resolved, will ultimately result in a decrease in the effectiveness and utility of the armed forces.

In 2008, the Department of Defense spending level, including supplemental related to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, exceeded the peak of the Cold and the peak of the Vietnam War.⁴¹ The attempt to transform the U.S. Military to meet the requirements of the post-Cold-War, which Defense Secretary Rumsfeld called “fundamentally joint,”⁴² may have further improved the effectiveness of the armed forces but failed to rebalance the capability portfolio to the desired capabilities as depicted in Figure 2.

³⁹ James R. Locher III, “Has it Worked?,” 98.

⁴⁰ Peter W. Chiarelli, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Autumn 1993), page 78.

⁴¹ Paul K. Davis, *Military Transformation? Which Transformation, and What Lies Ahead?* (Washington, DC: RAND, 2010), 39, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1413.pdf.

⁴² Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Transformation Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 2003), 1.




Figure 2 U.S. TRANSFORMATION FROM 1998

Source: RAND, Military Transformation?

New capabilities did not replace “old” ones and investments related to traditional threats were not reduced in favor of investments for new challenges illustrating the inability of unwillingness of the military establishment to make choices.⁴³ The financial crises which began in 2007, however, will inevitably affect the military expenditure and enforce choices to be made in force structure and capabilities. The problem is that such choices will be based on arguments of economy instead of strategy. While the solution should be found in more jointness, which the services publicly admit, in practice resource scarcity is more likely to encourage competition. It is hardly surprising that the services are advocating new strategies, which centers round their service doctrine and core capabilities at the possible expense of the other services. The advocacy of offshore balancing by the air force is illustrative.⁴⁴ Also illustrative in this context is the previously mentioned disestablishment of Joint Force Command. Arguing the achieved level of jointness within the U.S. Armed Forces the Vice-CJCS stated, “we believe we can no longer justify the expense and overhead associated with maintaining a separate four-star combatant command for that purpose.”⁴⁵ Interestingly, while efficiency through jointness is still far from achieved within the U.S. Armed Forces it was used as an

⁴³ Paul K. Davis, *Military Transformation*, 30.

⁴⁴ Dave Deptula, “Jointness, Airpower, and the Emerging Security Environment.”

⁴⁵ Senate, *Statement of General James E. Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Tuesday, September 28th, 2010, , <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/09%20September/Cartwright%2009-28-10.pdf>.

argument to remove the institution that served as its main driver. This brings up the question, how joint are the U.S. Armed Forces today?

Goldwater-Nichols intended to balance service interests with joint interests by making the services responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their forces, and the combatant commanders for the integration of these forces within their unified commands. The benefits of jointness should translate in increased effectiveness at the operational level. America now fights wars almost solely under joint commands. Its forces are undisputed the most potent armed forces in the world. Qualitative and quantitative the U.S. Armed Forces are unmatched. Operational success is therefore less a function of its capabilities than a function of the strategic and political circumstances and the type of war their fighting. The qualitative and quantitative supremacy of the U.S. Armed Forces obscures however the contribution of jointness to its effectiveness. Are the operational successes of the U.S. Armed Forces the result of joint effectiveness, and joint doctrine or merely the result of its overwhelming amount of manpower and capabilities, the doctrine of plenty? The U.S. Armed Forces have been involved in several operations after the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols and these should reflect a degree of jointness. The operation, which is often referred to as the manifestation of joint success, is Desert Storm. Another more recent operation, Anaconda, is often used as an example to illustrate the absence of jointness within the joint force.

Operation Desert Storm, which started 17 January until 28 February 1991, occurred only four years after Goldwater-Nichols and was too early to expect a truly joint operation. The Operation does reflect some of the effects Goldwater-Nichols intended. The COCOM, for example, effectively wielded his authority as force integrator and no service chief dared to go around him.⁴⁶ At field level however, the operation was more an example of successful deconfliction of forces fighting independently in the same theater, than a joint effort of effectively integrated forces. “Geography, not synergy, structured the responsibilities and missions of the service components in the Persian Gulf

⁴⁶ Bernard E. Trainor, “Jointness, Service Culture, and the Gulf War”, 74.

just as it did twenty-five years earlier in Southeast Asia.”⁴⁷ Despite the critique, as the first big operational success after the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, causality was inevitable and Desert Storm is now known as a joint success. Eleven years later, in 2002, Combined Joint Task Force–Mountain executed Operation Anaconda, one of the first large scale actions after 9/11. The operation was successfully completed but multiple problems in command and control arrangements, equipment interoperability, and execution of joint doctrine and procedures indicated the poor joint capabilities of the participating services units.⁴⁸ The forces in the field managed to overcome the problems, but had to rely on workarounds while a true joint force would have had the procedures in place and its personnel trained before entering the operation. The lessons from Operation Anaconda did result in initiatives to improve the effectiveness of joint fires training but, “It took perceived failures in battle to jolt the system into making needed changes. It also demonstrated that, jointness, in many ways was placed secondary to service desires until forced in the crucible of battle. And in spite of the plethora of lessons which could have been learned early on, there is little evidence that these lessons have been incorporated in to doctrine where appropriate.”⁴⁹ Other operations provide enough evidence to assert that the U.S. Armed Forces have become undeniably more capable and effective since the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols but to assert this to be a function of its jointness alone is absurd.

Conclusion

The Goldwater-Nichols Act successfully reformed the U.S. Armed Forces, allowing it to become the most capable and powerful military organization in the world. Its drafters recognized the need to diminish the influence of service parochialism and expected an increase of jointness in return. The strategic and political context did not allow for experimentation and necessitated an approach of balancing service and joint interests. This resulted in an organization in which the service responsibilities are limited

⁴⁷ William A. Owens, “Making the Joint Journey,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1999):92-95, 92, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1334.pdf.

⁴⁸ Lt Col Erik W. Hansen, *Goldwater-Nichols-Failing to go the Distance*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 9, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479113>.

⁴⁹ Lt Col Erik W. Hansen, *Goldwater-Nichols-Failing to go the Distance*, 11.

to organizing, training, and equipping the service forces, and combatant commanders have authority and responsibility to integrate these forces within their unified commands. The service chiefs however remained double-hatted, and although the JCS no longer depends on unanimity, as the Chairman is now the single military advisor to the secretary and the president, jointness at the policy and strategic level is still subordinated to service interests. The strategic and the political environment necessitate jointness to increase strategic flexibility and operational effectiveness while controlling the expenditure. The strategic environment however provides the armed forces with challenges, which makes it hard to make choices that would affect its capabilities as depicted in the below Figure 3.




Figure 3 CHALLENGES

Source: RAND, Military Transformation?

Efficiency and cost effectiveness, normally the main driver for jointness within the political context cannot be wielded. Congressmen's vested interests in defense make them ineffective in controlling the military expenditure. Redundancies, duplication, and inefficient use of resources are therefore likely to continue to exist. The increasing expenditure of the U.S. Armed Forces however, is unsustainable.

U.S. jointness is expensive and its benefits are limited. To advocate the improvement of operational effectiveness as a function of jointness without being able to capitalize on its efficiencies makes jointness rather pointless. Jointness within the U.S. Armed Forces is treated as a capability rather than an organizational philosophy. The

individual armed forces are willing to capitalize on the effectiveness function of jointness as it suites their interests. The efficiency function however is largely ignored. The risks associated with this deliberate ignorance of the expenditure are a sudden decrease in budget allocation, which cannot be absorbed without sacrificing operational capabilities. In this case this loss of capabilities would not be the effect of jointness but rather the lack thereof.



CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY III: DUTCH DEFENSE RESTRUCTURE 2003

Doing more with less is the battle cry of the hollow force
- Gen. Hostage, USAF

The Dutch Armed Forces are a small but agile military. Within 15 years after the end of the Cold War, it managed to transform itself successfully from a static, Cold War structure into a credible, mobile expeditionary force. The achievements of the Dutch Armed Forces are all the more impressive as it managed this change in the face of steady decreases in defense expenditures right after the end of the Cold War. The Dutch Armed Forces managed to transform into one of the most important troop contributing countries to NATO operations outside Western Europe and, its quality and diversity, provided a benchmark for most of the smaller NATO members to strive.¹ The political ambition of various Dutch governments to contribute to combat operations, as well as stability and reconstruction missions, resulted in the development of a wide military toolbox that provided politicians flexibility in decision making through a wide range of force options. Decreasing budgets and increasing costs of modernization and transformation necessitated an ongoing restructuring of the armed forces.

In 2003, the Dutch Government, from 2002 until 2010 a right of center tri-party coalition under Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende decided upon the biggest cuts yet seen in the defense budget. The net effect of these cuts was that the Dutch Armed Forces could no longer sustain its operational readiness without cutting into its toolbox of capabilities. This resulted in one of the largest defense-restructuring plans in the history of the Dutch Armed Forces. The plan sought a new balance between the tasks of the armed forces and the budget, in order to create affordable armed forces and the necessary funding for investments.² Jointness was both the justification and the main mechanism

¹ Rob de Wijk "Seeking the Right Balance: NATO and EU in Dutch Foreign and Defense Policy" in *Nação e Defesa*, no. 118-3 (Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2007):47-164, 150, http://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/123456789/741/1/NeD118_RobdeWijk.pdf.

² Rob de Wijk "Seeking the Right Balance," 162.

for the achievement of this new balance.³ Despite the implementation of the restructuring plan, the Dutch Armed Forces have not been able to balance between tasks and cost-cutting measures. Additional budget cuts after the first round necessitated sacrificing operational capabilities. Other capabilities, for which the Dutch Armed Forces were renowned, have come dangerously close to reaching critical mass.⁴ Without some hard choices, the Dutch Armed Forces are moving rapidly towards becoming a "hollow force."

The Dutch case is an example of overstretch under the banner of jointness. It demonstrates the limitations of jointness, particularly when the concept is dangerously used to (over-)emphasize efficiency at the expense of its other functions. Unlike the preceding chapter, which discussed jointness in the context of a superpower with almost limitless resources, the Dutch case is informative for small and medium powers that seek to maximize the political utility of their military instrument. The Dutch government considers military contributions to NATO and UN instrumental to its international credibility and prestige. In 2009 for instance, the Dutch government parlayed its invitation to participate in the G-20 discussions to directly discuss the Dutch military contributions in Afghanistan.⁵ The Dutch government therefore prefers a military toolbox, which provides it with multiple options to make contributions within a coalition framework. This ambition, however, is challenged by the fiscal reality of organizing, training, and equipping a joint toolbox comprised of various military tools. Rather than limiting its military options, the leaders of various Dutch governments have pursued a defense policy emphasizing a force structure that values efficiency above all else. Financial pressure is regarded instrumental for such a policy as "it stimulates effectiveness and prioritization."⁶ The financial reality became a means and created a

³ Segers, Rood en Hellema, ed., *Bezinning op het buitenland - Het Nederlands Buitenlands Beleid in een onzekere Wereld* (The Hague, Clingendael 2011) 155.

⁴ I define critical mass as the minimum level of capability necessary to maintain military relevance. Below this virtual threshold the unit is no longer capable of doctrine development and to anticipate the future but restricted strictly to minimal execution of its task.

⁵ Segers en Rood Hellema, *Bezinning op het buitenland*, 22.

⁶ Minister van Defensie, *Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief*, (Den Hague, NL: Minister von Defensie, 2 June 2006), HDAB2006018085, 25.

policy culture where budget cuts are considered a useful mechanism to pursue change.⁷ With the Dutch defense restructure in 2003, however, this mechanism reached its limits as the possibilities to preserve joint, military relevance through structural change were exhausted as this chapter demonstrates.

This chapter first provides an overview of the transformation and guiding defense policies of the Dutch Armed Forces after the Cold War leading up to the Dutch defense restructure in 2003. This overview precedes an analysis of the 2003 Dutch defense restructure using the framework of previous chapters that explores the strategic, political, and operational context of jointness. The findings of this chapter contribute to an understanding of the limitations of jointness and points to different dangers from the Canadian case in Chapter 2.

Dutch Military Transformation in the Name of Jointness– An Overview

The end of the Cold War caused a geopolitical change which had a profound impact on Dutch foreign and military policy. In 1991 the Dutch constitution contained a clause that declared the Dutch government would actively promote the international rule of law. In 1993 this clause was specifically related to the roles and missions of Dutch military. It reoriented the Dutch military role to become an instrument of liberal interventionism in support of the international rule of law.⁸ The Netherlands embarked on a transformation strategy aimed at increasing the ability of the Dutch state to provide for its security. Security for the Dutch, however, would not be based primarily on military capability: “Yet, as a medium power, it was not the Dutch desire to fight wars more effectively or counter a specific threat but rather to increase its influence within international, transatlantic and European contexts and do so within the context of supporting international rule of law and projecting a stabilizing influence.”⁹ Providing credible and relevant contributions to crisis-management operations would make the military instrument a more useful political tool. Flexibility, mobility, and interoperability

⁷ Rem Korteweg *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally – How Defense Transformation Divided NATO (1991-2008)*, (Leiden, NL: Leiden University Press, 2011), 276.

⁸ Ministerie van Defensie, *Defence Priorities Review: prioriteitennota 1993* (Delft, NL: Ministerie van Defensie, 1993), 6.

⁹ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 217.

were put forward as key concepts around which to restructure the military. At the same time, with the threat of Dutch existence removed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Dutch leaders were quick to see a “peace dividend” and they significantly decreased the defense budget. Rather than countering a specific threat, political ambition became the guiding principle behind Dutch defense policy as this section demonstrates.

After the Cold War, Dutch defense policy changed from one that was threat-driven to one driven by capability instead. During the Cold War, the Dutch Armed Forces were oriented towards the existential threat of a Soviet invasion, which had resulted in a static, territorial defense force. Deterring a possible attack from the east was the main goal. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 diminished the threat of a massive Soviet attack and allowed for a restructure of the armed forces with less standing forces and a larger reserve force. Emphasis shifted towards mobility and flexibility in support of NATO’s counter-concentration concept.¹⁰ The real change came with the 1993 defense white paper (*prioriteitennota*), which no longer focused on a continental threat but emphasized the ability to contribute to crisis response operations. The Dutch Armed Forces would become more important as an instrument of foreign policy. The foreign and national security policy orientation shifted from defense towards intervention.¹¹ This necessitated highly mobile expeditionary armed forces but also allowed for a significant smaller in size.

The decrease in size of the Dutch Armed Forces and prohibitive policy against deployment of conscripts, except on voluntary basis, led to a second change, the suspension of conscription and creation of an all-volunteer armed forces. Crises response operations necessitated a higher standard of training and rapid deployment, the costs of which a conscript army would be prohibitive. The suspension of conscription and reorientation from threat to intervention also caused a shift in planning methodology. The size and capabilities of the armed forces were no longer based on the threat but on

¹⁰ E.R. Muller et al., eds., *Krijgsmacht: Studies Over de Organisatie En Het Optreden* (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer, 2004), 154.

¹¹ E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht*, 157.

the political ambitions of the Dutch government.¹² By the end of 2000 the size of the Dutch Armed Forces had decreased from 261,000, including 15.000 reserve forces in 1990 to 75.000 and only 5.600 reserve forces in 2000.¹³ Although almost 50 per cent reduced in size, and despite continuing budget cuts, the Dutch Armed Forces by then had transformed into a highly professional and motivated fighting force. The success of the Dutch Armed Forces transformation was underlined by the credit it received from the United States for its participation in the NATO-led Operation Allied Force. In his congressional testimony in October 1999, Lt-Gen Michael Short (USAF) referred to the Netherlands as part of an “A-team,” or Premier League, of allies.¹⁴ With this statement the Dutch Armed Forces were recognized as part of the select group of Western military powers, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, that are most capable to perform expeditionary operations. This “A-team” status was important, as it was perceived domestically to provide the Netherlands political-strategic benefits: “It would allow the Netherlands to make its voice heard to promote its security interests.”¹⁵ Confronted with financial crises in 2002 and increasing costs of military modernization and weapon systems, preserving the “A-team” status necessitated a rigorous restructuring of the Dutch Armed Forces, which became the impetus behind the Dutch Defense Restructure in 2003.

In 2003 the cumulative effects of continuous budget cuts and increasing operational costs became unsustainable. To remain relevant and preserve the “A-team” status the armed forces needed to increase its expenditure on procurement to 30 per cent of its annual budget. The actual percentage however had over the years decreased to 13 per cent. A rigorous restructure of the armed forces was the only option to free up money

¹² The foreign policy can be characterized by bandwagoning with the United States and NATO and maintaining a healthy balance with Washington as primary hedge against the rise to dominance of one of the larger powers in Europe. Participation in UN or NATO-led expeditionary crisis management operation serve as a vehicle to increase the Netherlands’ political influence. In 1995, Minister of foreign affairs Van Mierlo stated “providing troops to peace keeping operations means that, in the Dutch vision, participation in relevant international deliberations is guaranteed.” Arie Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 254.

¹³ Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensienota 2000* (The Hague, NL: SDU Publishers, 1999).

¹⁴ Senate Armed Services Committee, *Lessons Learned from Military Operations and Relief Efforts in Kosovo*, 21 October 1999, www.lexis-nexis.com/CIS..

¹⁵ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 254-255.

from the budget to increase the percentage for procurement. The armed forces needed “rebalancing” and quality over quantity was the mantra behind the change. This mantra was central theme of the 2003 Ministry of Defense White Paper: “We will increase the sustainability and effectiveness of the armed forces at the expense of the size of its size and the amount of available weapon systems.”¹⁶ In addition, the White Paper dictated the need for greater efficiencies, a decrease in the amount of weapon systems, and a further 11,700 reduction of personnel. The White Paper also stressed the importance of preserving military relevance for the most important allies within the alliance: “It is within the light of reason that the armed forces engage in a limited number of high capacities, without there being an extreme form of specialization or unduly restriction of choice between military options.”¹⁷ Reductions alone, however, could not solve the problem. Overhead and administrative costs had to decrease, necessitating even greater efficiencies. To achieve these efficiencies the individual services within the Dutch Armed Forces, the Army (*Koninklijke Landmacht*, or KL), Navy (*Koninklijke Marine*, or KM), Air Force (*Koninklijke Luchtmacht*, or KLu), and Military Constabulary (*Koninklijke Marechaussee*, or KMar), lost their independence.

Until 2003 the four individual services had remained independent and retained their own budgeting power. The shift from threat-based to capability-based planning had allowed the services to pursue their own interests as there was little pressure to stimulate coordinating investments and procurement policies to develop effective expeditionary capabilities.¹⁸ Previous budget cuts had always been absorbed by method of incremental reduction. The pain was equally distributed among the services that would reduce a number of weapon systems, a method known colloquially with Dutch military circles as “the cheese-grater approach.” Investments in new capabilities came at the expense of existing capabilities, with the following net impact: “A wholesale revision of capabilities was not undertaken, instead there were persistently fewer capabilities.”¹⁹ In 2003 the

¹⁶ Ministerie van Defensie, *Op weg naar een nieuw evenwicht: De Krijgsmacht in de Komende Jaren (Prinsjesdagbrief)* Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 X, No. 1. 1.

¹⁷ Ministerie van Defensie, *Op weg naar een nieuw evenwicht*, 25.

¹⁸ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 275.

¹⁹ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 275.

cheese-grater approach was no longer feasible and for the first time since 1991 capabilities were sacrificed. The KM lost its Orion maritime patrol airplanes and the KL its Multiple Launcher Rocket System. Within the KLu the number of fighter aircraft decreased from 137 to 108.²⁰ The services lost their budgeting power and independence to the Commander of the Armed Forces (CDS) who became responsible for the corporate planning and execution of operations. The services would remain responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their forces. Support and specialized functions for the services became joint, emphasizing a modular approach towards the structure of the armed forces. The rationale for the joint approach to support services, according the 2003 White Paper, was as follows: “A standard recipe for military deployment no longer exists, threats, risks and circumstances are fluid and demand flexibility, necessitating a modular approach.”²¹ This approach acknowledged and preserved the “toolbox”-like character of the Dutch Armed Forces.

In making further cuts and amalgamating support services, the toolbox of the Dutch Armed Forces had become wider but also shallower and this point was not lost on some external observers. For example, in her advice to the Dutch Government on the structure of the Dutch Armed Forces for international crises response, the Advisory Counsel on International Affairs (AIV),²² chaired by the former President of the Senate Korthals Altes, concluded that her previous advice in 1999 for restructuring the armed forces and increase of expenditure to enable necessary investments had been neglected. This neglect now resulted in a decrease of capabilities, which also necessitated, in the AIV’s opinion, a decrease of ambition. Rather than choosing between capabilities, the approach taken by the Dutch government was to distribute cuts equally throughout the armed forces. Although this “cheese-grater approach” preserved the broad spectrum of

²⁰ E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht*, 173-174.

²¹ Minister van Defensie, *Nieuw Evenwicht, Nieuwe Ontwikkelingen: Naar een toekomstbestendige krijgsmacht. Actualisering van de Prinsjesdagbrief*, HDAB2006018085, June 2, 2006, p. 18.

²² The AIV is an advisory body for the Dutch government and parliament. In particular its reports address the policy of the minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Development Cooperation and the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The AIV has four permanent committees covering these areas. More information on the AIV and its work can be found on their official website: <http://www.aiv-advies.nl/>

military capabilities, the number of personnel and weapon systems constituting those capabilities continued to shrink. The AIV expressed serious doubt whether the remaining sustainability capability would meet the ambition as reflected in the 2003 Ministry of Defense White Paper.²³

Dutch military ambitions, although adjusted in the White Paper, were incommensurate with the fiscal realities. At the same time as the “cheese-grater approach” to budget cuts was making the military toolbox even shallower, the 2003 White Paper introduced procurement plans for high-end capabilities, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as ground surveillance systems. These higher-end capabilities would better enable the Dutch Armed Forces to operate in operations at the higher intensity end of the military spectrum. Contributions to initial, forcible entry missions in non-permissive environments became part of the ambition behind the acquisition of these higher-end capabilities. Although the limited sustainability of such high intensity military operations was recognized in the 2003 White Paper, lowering the ambition on the number of simultaneous operations and their duration, the spectrum of conflict in which the Dutch Armed Forces were expected to operate actually broadened.²⁴ The military toolbox would provide even more options but the forces were spread very thin and many capabilities were dangerously close to their critical mass, or operational breaking point. This breaking point would become apparent with the sustained Dutch participation in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan.

From 2006 to 2010, the Netherlands deployed a task force to Afghanistan to participate in the NATO-led mission labeled the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF was characterized as “the cornerstone of Dutch security policy” and “the proof of the pudding” of the potential limits of the contributions of Dutch military forces overseas.²⁵ The 1,700 strong Dutch contingent as part of ISAF included two infantry battalions, six F-16 fighter aircraft, six Apache assault helicopters, three armored PzH 2000 *pantzerhowitzer* artillery systems, and CH-47 Chinook and Eurocopter Cougar

²³ Advisory Council on International Affairs, *The Netherlands and Crisis Management, Three Issues of Current Interest*, advisory report no. 34 (The Hague, NL, March 2004), 19.

²⁴ Ministerie van Defensie, *Prinsjesdagbrief*. 34.

²⁵ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 285.

transport helicopters. This contingent was the largest deployment abroad of the Dutch military in contemporary history.²⁶ The operation was initially budgeted at 380 million Euros but in the first year the budget had exceeded 600 million Euros, almost four times more than originally planned.²⁷ With 1,700 troops deployed, the operation was consuming 9 per cent of the entire defense budget. As a result, new budget cuts were announced in the primary weapon systems and procurement of the high-end capabilities mentioned in the 2003 White Paper was canceled. The net effect of operations in Afghanistan on existing Dutch capabilities was just as stark: “The military was cannibalizing its hardware to sustain current operations.”²⁸ In 2010 the task force completed its deployment to Afghanistan, returned to the Netherlands, and the Dutch Armed Forces were faced once again with another round of budget cuts.

The 2008 budget cuts did not result from internal Dutch pressures but rather from an unanticipated external source: the international financial crisis which began in 2007 but hit the countries of Europe first in 2008. In order to balance its budget the Dutch government, a minority right-winged coalition under Prime Minister Mark Rutte, has “taxed” the armed forces to achieve savings annually of almost 1 billion Euros. Given that capabilities had already been cut down to the bare minimum to meet existing roles and missions, not to eroded to support on-going operations in Afghanistan, it is apparent that the “cheese-grater approach” towards budget cuts is no longer an option. The size of the force will decrease by 12,000 troops, procurements become less than 16 per cent of the budget and investments, replacement of obsolete equipment and improvements to existing one are postponed indefinitely. In addition, overhead will be decreased by 30 per cent. The number of weapon systems within the current capabilities, that provided policy makers with their flexible “toolbox” for foreign policy, will be further decreased. This includes, for example, the complete dissolution and abolishment of the once-formidable Dutch armored corps of Leopard-1 and Leopard-2 main battle tanks. Such reductions, however, have not stopped those in the Minister of Defense from trying to

²⁶ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 286.

²⁷ NRC Handelsblad, “Kosten Uruzgan 200 miljoen hoger,” *NRC Handelsblad*, June, 2007.

²⁸ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 297.

maintain a brave façade in the face of such cuts: “the armed forces might become smaller but their ability to play in the champions-league will be maintained.”²⁹ While the possibilities for greater efficiency within the armed forces on a national level are almost exhausted,³⁰ the Dutch government expects to find even more efficiencies and cost reductions through jointness not within the Dutch Armed Forces, but within those regionally within Europe. As the total defense expenditure of NATO’s European members shrank by 29 billion Euros in 2009 and 2010 alone, the prospects of achieving such efficiencies are slim.³¹ When no one is willing to pay the bill to sustain “A-team” capabilities within the Netherlands, only a hollow force will remain.

The Dutch Defense Restructure 2003 and the Nature of Jointness

The transformation of the Dutch Armed Forces after the Cold War from a large standing, defensively-oriented Army into a small agile expeditionary force is impressive. Jointness was never an explicit goal of this transformation but it was instrumental in the need to leverage efficiencies, allowing the Dutch Armed Forces to absorb continuous cuts on their budget while maintaining military relevance and political utility. The remainder of this chapter analyzes the Dutch Defense Restructure, utilizing the three different contexts that exert an influence on jointness to identify how compatible the Dutch utilization of jointness is commensurate with its nature.

Strategic context

The most significant feature of the strategic context of the Netherlands is its benign security environment. The end of the Cold War ended the existential threat that provided the Dutch defense policy with its primary focus. Intra-European military competition was stifled by the ongoing process of European integration. With the United States as its primary security guarantor, Europe as well as the Netherlands was more

²⁹ Spits, “Krijgsmacht blijft van niveau Champions League” April 2004. http://static-spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/2011/04/krijgsmacht_blijft_niveau_cham.html

³⁰ Segers Rood en Hellema, ed., *Bezinning op het buitenland*, 170.

³¹ Advisory Counsel on International Affairs, *Sovereignty and the Capacity to Act*, advisory report no. 78 (The Hague, January 2012), 7.

secure than ever. The reorientation of the Dutch security strategy is therefore more a product of Dutch strategic culture than by external threats.

Dutch strategic culture can be defined by four characteristics. The first is a strong legal approach. It might not be a coincidence that Hugo Grotius, one of the founders of international law, is a Dutchman. As a small country, the military power of the Netherlands, with the exception for a brief period during the 17th century,³² has always been limited. The Dutch therefore have always attached great value to a strong international legal order to ensure security and stability. This legal tradition provides an explanation for the Dutch promotion of The Hague as the world capital of international law.³³ Currently the city of The Hague facilitates the UN organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Yugoslavia Tribunal (ICTY), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Netherlands has also become a strong proponent of international organizations, which is a second characteristic. For a small country, these institutions are important as, when functioning properly, they can constrain the ambitions of the major powers. The Netherlands were therefore among the founding members of the present day European Union, NATO, the UN, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank, and others. This reliance on international law and multinational organizations enhanced a third characteristic, a certain degree of anti-militarism and pacifism.

Although the Dutch have fought many colonial wars, which refutes any absolute argument about their pacifist nature, the small size of the country, economic dependence on global trade, and the limited size of its armed forces have made its leaders and populous consider international law and multinational organizations better instruments to create an orderly world. Dutch humanist and Christian traditions, which run deep in the society, reinforce this thought and also brings forth a certain degree of social and political

³² During the period of the Golden Age (1602 – 1672), the Dutch economy flourished through its commerce and the Netherlands became a world power, dominating world trade and with a strong navy protecting its interests. More on the Golden Age can be found on the website of the Amsterdam Centre for the Study of the Golden Age available at <http://www.goldenage.uva.nl/acga-home>

³³ Rob de Wijk “Seeking the Right Balance,” 150.

moralism.³⁴ The defense budget therefore has always remained small relative to other social, political, and economic concerns and as a result is under constant pressure to be reduced.

The fourth characteristic of Dutch strategic culture is its anti-continental focus. One author has characterized this focus, in relation to other aspects of Dutch strategic culture, in the following way: “The Netherlands is not a major power and it finds security in a strengthened regime of international law rather than being at the whims of the major powers in the system.”³⁵ The Dutch have always tried to remain independent from the major continental powers, France and Germany. This explains to a large degree the trans-Atlantic orientation of Dutch foreign policy and national security. The rationale behind this orientation is relatively straight-forward: “By playing the transatlantic card, they not only remain independent from major continental European powers, but exercise disproportional influence in international affairs, e.g. through international organizations like NATO.”³⁶ These four characteristics of Dutch strategic culture help place the Dutch strategic orientation after the end of the Cold War in context.

The main goal for Dutch foreign policy is the maintenance of a stable regional and global environment in which the economy can flourish and the influence of great powers on its policies is mitigated. As the international security environment became unstable after the end of the Cold War, the Dutch needed to reorient their foreign policy. No longer would there be a direct threat against the Netherlands but escalating crises elsewhere in the world, such as those in the Balkan region following the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early and mid-1990s, could cause regional instabilities, refugees, and obstruct global commerce. These risks could indirectly affect Dutch interests or the international rule of law. Such risks and influence on Dutch interests could also necessitate Dutch participation in peace keeping and crises response missions.³⁷ The Dutch fear that the U.S. would lose its strategic interest in Europe, enabling one of the European major powers to establish regional hegemony which

³⁴ Rob de Wijk “Seeking the Right Balance,” 151.

³⁵ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 234.

³⁶ Rob de Wijk “Seeking the Right Balance,” 151.

³⁷ E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht*, 157.

translated into its foreign policy, helps explain the Dutch emphasis on European integration and stimulation of multilateralism as a counterbalance. European integration is important to avoid domination by a major continental power as one author has suggested: “Supra-nationalism can be a shield under which Small powers can resist political pressure of large integration partners.”³⁸ Multilateralism, in turn, is important to assure Dutch international influence by “creat[ing] opportunity to become involved in military interventions; it also creates a normative premium on action by these states as opposed to the strongest states and gives them significant say in the kinds of rules that evolve concerning multilateral action.”³⁹ With institutions acting as a guarantor of Dutch national security the military became instrumental in the conduct of Dutch foreign policy, to raise its profile and interest to “punch above its weight.” To enable effective contributions to international crises response operation, the Dutch military instrument needed to transform into an expeditionary force. The size and structure of the Dutch Armed Forces no longer correlated to specific threat but were instead based on broad capabilities to provide political leaders with a greater range of options. The strategic relevance of the Dutch Armed Forces was now only determined by its political utility as the next section suggests.

Political context

Without a strategic necessity for their existence, the Dutch Armed Forces became vulnerable for the dynamics of domestic politics. The main question within this context is: What purpose does a military serve? This question was answered, in part, by one author: “Linking the development of the military to an expression of political ambition rather than specific threats was the key through which questions could be answered what the military was for following 1991 and how much the Dutch public was willing to spend on it.”⁴⁰ With only a small domestic defense industry, predominantly oriented on system components, the influence of the military-industrial complex on Dutch defense policy is negligible. Socially the Dutch public enjoys a high level of public services compared to

³⁸ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 223.

³⁹ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 224.

⁴⁰ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 257.

the United States and even most countries in Europe. Elected Dutch politicians are very aware of the relationship between decreases in expenditure on public services and the support of their constituents. Defense, therefore, is always a safe alternative when budget cuts are necessary.⁴¹ Although both sides of the political spectrum support the promotion of international rule of law, projection of stability, and use of the military instrument to boost Dutch international relevance,⁴² the absence of a link between the military and a specific threat, as well as the vicissitudes of political ambition associated with governance based on tenuous coalitions, allows the Netherlands constant reinterpretation of how its international relevance should be maintained.

The military instrument should enable the Dutch government to increase its international political influence. The Dutch government therefore embarked on a pursuit of relevance “by being a good ally and making relevant contributions which would increase the political credit of the Netherlands. A healthy relationship with the United States would keep the United States committed to NATO, improving Netherlands’ ability to protect its vital security interests and reducing the risk that the United States exclusively relied on London, Paris and Berlin as European interlocutors.”⁴³ This pursuit translated into an ambitious transformation program for the Dutch military under the following considerations: “The Netherlands wanted to play a role of importance in the European and Transatlantic security framework. The ambition was never to have capabilities that were merely relevant but capabilities instead that were high-profile, and that would give the Netherlands a position of significance.”⁴⁴ Fiscal challenges, however, have continuously influenced transformation. The defense white papers issued during the period after the Cold War demonstrate the inability of the government to reconcile its ambitions for the military as an instrument of political influence with the budget. The Defense White Paper of 1993 (*prioriteitennota*) was arguably the most

⁴¹ According to the Dutch Expertise and Advisory Center for Citizenship and International Cooperation the Dutch public favors cuts to expenditure on international aid, European integration, and defense ahead of services. Frans van den Boom, “1 miljard bezuinigen is kortzichtig,” *NCDO*, 29 April 2011 <http://www.ncdo.nl/artikel/1-miljard-bezuinigen-kortzichtig>

⁴² Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 281.

⁴³ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 253.

⁴⁴ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 253.

important one after the Cold War as it stated the goal of transforming the Dutch Armed Forces into a smaller but more mobile and flexible force. The White Paper also mentioned the need for maintaining a quota on procurement at somewhere between 28-30 per cent of the total defense budget.⁴⁵ Only a year later a significant budget cuts necessitated restructuring of the armed forces and this would be followed by even more, and more drastic cuts. The AIV warned against the disproportionate, long-term effects that continued budget cuts would have on the Dutch Armed Forces in the name of “jointness” in her 1999 report:

Not all efficiency measures have resulted in savings. The increased integration between the services has improved their ability for modern warfare but the cost benefits of the integration are lower than expected. Moreover, the limits of efficiency seems to have been reached as further efficiency measured will result in loss of specific expertise within the services. Delayed procurements have resulted in a *bow wave effect* (emphasis added). The risk coming with this bow wave has increased. Since 1993, the procurement percentage of the total defense budget has not exceeded 22.7 per cent where 28-30 per cent was needed according to the *Prioriteitennota*. Delaying necessary procurements result in loss of sustainability as accelerated wear and tear of weapon systems and equipment due to deployments requires replacements, which cannot be procured. This results in increasing maintenance costs and higher operational costs, spiraling the armed forces into a vicious circle.⁴⁶

The AIV concluded that restructuring the Dutch Armed Forces would be insufficient to address the problems and she advised the Dutch government to face the consequences of their military ambition and organize, train, and equip the armed forces accordingly. The government’s answer was the 2003 Defense Restructure.

With the White Paper on the Defense Restructure (2003), the Dutch government rejected the advice of the AIV. The government’s desire to remain part of the “A-team” necessitated investments in high-end systems, which could only be financed through cuts in operational weapon systems and a reduction of the total number of armed forces.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ministerie van Defensie, *Prioriteitennota*, 70.

⁴⁶ Advisory Counsel on International Affairs, *De ontwikkelingen in de Internationale Veiligheidssituatie in de Jaren Negentig: Van Onveilige Zekerheid naar Onzekere Veiligheid*, advice no. 10 (The Hague, 1999), 41.

⁴⁷ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 271.

The White Paper emphasized the ambition to deploy troops as part of an initial entry operation. This was only feasible by scaling down the level of ambition regarding the size of force packages, number of simultaneous deployments, and the duration of deployments. Nevertheless, the AIV was extremely doubtful whether even this scaled down level of ambition would be sustainable given the budget.⁴⁸ The organizational costs needed to be reduced to achieve greater efficiency, ostensibly to free up funding to transform the force. Cost reductions came primarily in the form of the virtual abolishment of the independent services, which retained their individual names but which lost their separate organization and support functions. The services would continue as individual, functional commands that organized, trained, and equipped their specific forces. The CDS, however, provided overall direction to the services and became the corporate planner for the Dutch Armed Forces responsible for procurement planning, force integration, and deployment. The new structure of the armed forces demonstrates the emphasis on efficiency in the name of jointness, concentrating all support functions in service centers under a single service, joint command. Personnel, material resources, and finance and control are concentrated in separate directorates. The three directors, together with the CDS, form "the corporate board" of the armed forces. The CDS therefore shares authority with three directors who each have access to the secretary-general, the highest civil servant within the Ministry of Defense and in charge of the central staff of the Ministry. The former services, which are now operational commands, have become business units within a structure designed to maximize efficiency over effectiveness. The absence of a unifying, joint headquarters within the Dutch organizational structure serves to emphasize the point that cost effectiveness, rather than military effectiveness, is the key motivator behind Dutch "jointness."

The Dutch government would continue to ignore criticisms and warning signs that its actions, in the form of budget reductions while increasing operations tempo, was hollowing out the armed forces. In 2007, the Minister of Defense wrote to the parliament that, "in contrast to 2003, the government has agreed on increasing the expenditure on

⁴⁸ Advisory Council on International Affairs, Advisory report no. 34, (The Hague, 2004), 22.

defense through selling military equipment.”⁴⁹ The answer yet again to the hard question of budget versus capability was reducing the number of weapon systems to free up budget share to fund necessary (re)investments. The following quote from the same letter by the Minister of Defense demonstrates the deceiving logic of jointness in its political context: “Decreasing the number of weapon systems is no easy choice, nevertheless it is necessary to allow investments. The complementary character of different weapon systems like battle helicopters validates this choice. We must recognize however that the amount of weapon systems is only one element of military power. Enhancing these other elements, e.g. decreasing the amount of fighter airplanes will improve the balance with the available maintenance capacity.”⁵⁰ Even with the latest round of budget cuts, which abolishing the Dutch armored capability and reduced a number of other weapon systems. The Navy lost four of its ten mine-hunting vessels, and two out of four patrol vessels. The amount of fighter aircraft within the Air Force was reduced from 87 to 68 and Patriot Air Defense Batteries were reduced from four to three. The procurement of what should have become the third DC-10, necessary to increase the strategic airlift capability for the Dutch forces, was cancelled.⁵¹ Political ambitions vastly outstrip military reality. The most recent White Paper points out just how far ambitions have overtaken reality: “Military power and sustainability will inevitably decrease, the ability to provide the Government with different options however necessitates preserving capabilities to participate in the higher-spectrum of military conflict.”⁵² The reality for the Dutch Armed Forces now is that financial constraints no longer allow the armed forces to meet the requirements for operations more demanding than low-intensity stability operations in permissive security environments.⁵³ The Dutch polity also emphasizes international cooperation to increase efficiency so as to not jeopardize core services, a point that has

⁴⁹ Ministerie van Defensie, *wereldwijd dienstbaar*, Kamerstuk 31 243, No.1. (Den Haag, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008), 2.

⁵⁰ Ministerie van Defensie, *wereldwijd dienstbaar*, 30.

⁵¹ Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensie na de Kredietcrisis: een kleinere krijgsmacht in een onrustige wereld* (Den Haag, 2011), 15-21.

⁵² Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensie na de Kredietcrisis*, 15.

⁵³ Segers, Rood en Hellema, ed., *Bezinning op het buitenland*, 26.

not been lost on Dutch politicians.⁵⁴ The current AIV, however, points out that savings as a result of international cooperation, just like eliminating capabilities while not reducing roles and missions, is a path fraught with much peril: “The AIV emphasizes that cost savings as a result of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should not be seen as paving the way for further cuts in the Dutch defense budget.”⁵⁵ Without a serious incentive to invest in its military, the likelihood of successive Dutch governments acting upon this advice seems low and unfortunately the hollowing of the Dutch Armed Forces will continue.

Operational context

Within the operational context the transformation and restructure of the Dutch Armed Forces has achieved mixed results. Perhaps the most important observation within this context is that the Dutch Armed Forces will primarily conduct military operations as part of an international coalition. From an operational perspective, the ability to cooperate with foreign sister services in combined operations has therefore always been more important than cooperation within the Dutch Armed Forces. Before 1990 the services contributed to different strategic commands within NATO: the KL, for example, in West Germany, the KLu in the central European region, KLu air defenses as part of the NATO air defense system within the British region, and the KM as part of the NATO amphibious force operating around Norway. Cooperation between the services before 1990 was therefore almost non-existent.⁵⁶ Even after 1990, the reorientation of foreign policy that drove significant changes in the tasks, roles, and mission of the armed forces did not emphasize jointness. Within the Ministry of Defense it was decided to leave the existing naval, land, and air force structures intact with the services still in control of their own budgets. The command structure of the Dutch Armed Forces reflected the nature of civilian and military control, with both the Secretary-General and the Minister of Defense supervising the armed forces politically. A committee of service chiefs, chaired by the Chief of Staff and subordinate to the Secretary-General, provided

⁵⁴ Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensie na de Kredietcrisis*, 26.

⁵⁵ Advisory Counsel on International Affairs, advisory report no. 78, 55.

⁵⁶ E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht*, 671.

military supervision. Decision-making between these various bodies was based on consensus.⁵⁷ The integration of the services therefore remained limited in scope and scale until it was necessitated by financial constraints.

The measure of operational effectiveness for the Dutch forces jointly lies in its ability to integrate at service level with coalition partners. The Dutch White Paper on Defense 2000 (*defensienota*) stressed the importance of international interoperability to maintain military relevance.⁵⁸ The Dutch Armed Forces were already participating in multinational units: the KM in the UK/NL amphibious force, the KL in the 1st German/Dutch Army Corps, and the KLu in the Belgium/Dutch Deployable Air Task Force. The 2000 White Paper stressed the need for more integration between the services within the Dutch Armed Forces predominantly from the perspective of efficiency: “Cooperation between the services enables efficiencies, especially in battle- and logistical support.”⁵⁹ This view on jointness explains why the “cheese-grater approach,” as an instrument for accommodating budget cuts, persisted throughout the 1990’s. This approach allowed Dutch politicians to avoid making difficult decisions regarding defense while still allowing the services to preserve their capability to cooperate with foreign sister services. Doctrinal development was exclusively service-driven and oriented, with an overarching defense doctrine (*De Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine*, or *The Dutch Defense Doctrine*) unpublished until late in 2005. The 112-page *De Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine* contains only four pages dedicated to joint operations.⁶⁰ This again illustrates that jointness within the Dutch Armed Forces was not driven by operational effectiveness or necessity but cost-effectiveness instead.

Decreasing costs through greater efficiencies was the main goal behind the Dutch Defense Restructure. The abolishment of the services and the installment of a CDS responsible for corporate planning were instrumental for creating efficiency. Corporate planning would enable efficiencies through centrally directed choices regarding procurement. The consequence of the increasing costs of new systems is the large claim

⁵⁷ E.R. Muller et al., *Krijgsmacht*, 677.

⁵⁸ Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensienota 2000* (The Hague, SDU Publishers, 1999), 54.

⁵⁹ Ministerie van Defensie, *Defensienota 2000*, 51,

⁶⁰ Ministerie van Defensie, *De Nederlandse Defensie Doctrine* (Zwolle, PlantijnCasparie, 2005).

they make on the total defense budget. For example, the controversial F-16 replacement platform, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, has cost the Dutch government almost 800 million Euros before the first aircraft was delivered, and that aircraft has a price tag of almost 100 million Euros by itself.⁶¹ In the zero-sum game of defense budgets, a large procurement project of one service will necessarily leave fewer funds for the other services. Corporate planning through the CDS is intended to balance these requirements.⁶² The problem, however, occurs as a result of the political consequence of the choices the corporate planner needs to make. The political desire to have a widest possible toolbox of options, to ensure the greatest operational flexibility, prohibits the corporate planner making big choices forces him instead to continue cutting redundancies, overhead, and support functions. Such cuts, increase interdependence while at the same time decrease force sustainability. Through the 1990's this necessity to balance between budget and means is recognized as a dominant driver of transformation.⁶³ Indeed, the Dutch Armed Forces, despite or even perhaps because of the continuous financial constraints placed upon it, transformed into a lean, expeditionary force with impressive, if short-lived track record for such a small country.

Since the end of the Cold War the Dutch Armed Forces have participated in multinational operations. The positive reviews of these contributions from its allies confirm that the Dutch Armed Forces successfully transformed into a credible expeditionary force despite numerous budget cuts. During Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), a number of Americans, including the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, LtGen Michael Short, acknowledged that the KLu was one of the few air forces in Europe capable to fight alongside them.⁶⁴ Almost a decade later, KL General Tom van Loon, commanding general of NATO's Regional Command-South in

⁶¹ For details see Frans van den Boom, "1 miljard bezuinigen is kortzichtig," *NCDO Online* available online at <http://www.ncdo.nl/artikel/1-miljard-bezuinigen-kortzichtig>, accessed 7 May 2012 and "First JSF Rolls Off Production Line," *Defense-Aerospace.com* (5 April 2012), available online at <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/134179/first-dutch-f-35-jsf-rolls-off-production-line.html>, accessed 7 May 2012.

⁶² Starink Muller and Jong en de Bosch ed., *Krijgsmacht, Studies over de organisatie en het optreden*, 678.

⁶³ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 275.

⁶⁴ Segers, Rood en Hellema, ed., *Bezinning op het buitenland*, 27.

Afghanistan, said that American Special Forces in Southern Afghanistan specifically requested Dutch F-16's for close air support missions "indicated how far the Dutch military had come" and as evidence that the Dutch military had in fact been transformed. The Dutch had proven their relevance to their key trans-Atlantic ally, the United States, in high-intensity operations and as a result "transformation, van Loon declared, was finished."⁶⁵ The deployment in 2006 of a joint task force of 1,700 armed forces personnel to Afghanistan, the largest high-intensity deployment of Dutch forces since the Korean War,⁶⁶ demonstrated how expeditionary and capable the Dutch Armed Forces had become. This same deployment, however, demonstrated how shallow the Dutch toolkit had become in terms of sustainability in key areas of capability, including airlift: "Helicopter and tactical transport were in short supply. For six months no Chinook helicopters were in use because there was a shortage of spare parts and technicians. The KL had to rely on aging Cougars instead."⁶⁷ The Dutch contribution to Afghanistan, while demonstrating the capability of its armed forces to operate at the same level as the most significant NATO countries, impose a tremendous cost in terms of the zero-sum defense budget. The contribution to ISAF cost annually close to one-tenth of the total defense budget. In addition to these costs, which robbed replacement of worn equipment as well as research and development funds, additional budget cuts were programmed. The net effect of these budgetary squeeze on both ends of the spectrum—political and operational—was the abolition of a number of core capabilities and competencies of the Dutch Armed Forces, including the KL's armored capability which ironically closely tied the country to the German *Bundesheer* (Army) through joint exercises, exchanges, and professional military education.

It is clear that the efficiency function of jointness can no longer be applied to the Dutch Armed Forces. The broad toolbox approach of military capabilities favored by political leaders over the past fifteen years has already been broken. It is not irreparable, however, but this would require successive governments to spend more on defense. In

⁶⁵ General Ton van Loon, "Remarks at Counter Insurgency Symposium" (The Hague, NL: Netherlands Institute for Military History, 2007).

⁶⁶ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 283.

⁶⁷ Rem Korteweg, *The Superpower, the Bridge-builder and the Hesitant Ally*, 297.

order to keep selected capabilities and competencies above their minimum threshold, and to free funding for continuous transformation, the choice is either a focused toolbox or developing specific niche capabilities. Following the latter path condemns the Netherlands to adopt the approach towards military capabilities taken by the Belgians several decades ago to their detriment. The 2011 White Paper, however, continues to promote the broad toolbox under the fiction of additional budget reductions. In 2011 the Dutch Armed Forces contributed to Operation Unified Protector in Libya with four F-16s. The Netherlands Court of Audit, which is comparable to the US General Accounting Office, sharply warned that the Dutch contribution dramatically exposed the "gap" between KLu ambitions and its available capabilities. The Court of Audit concluded that the required amount of training hours for the pilots is prohibitive for participation in missions such as Libya as the former would consume too much of the available budget.⁶⁸ The Court's opinion illustrates that the KLu in particular, and the Dutch Armed Forces in general, have already reached the natural limit in terms of robbing the organizing, training, and equipping Peter to pay the operational and budgetary Paul. Unless the Dutch government makes hard choices for the future, the Dutch Armed Forces may move beyond a hollow force operationally into a political and strategic irrelevance. However, a possible way to mitigate the financial pressures yet ensure key Dutch influence may be forthcoming. NATO's new *Smart Defence Concept* could present a possibility for the Dutch Armed Forces to take one or more leadership roles as framework nation within NATO ensuring and maybe expanding its influence and at the same time enhance our relationship with the United States. As NATO explains on its Internet page:

From 2008 the world economy has been facing its worst period since the end of the Second World War. Governments are applying budgetary restrictions to tackle this serious recession, which is having a considerable effect on defence spending. ... The crisis in Libya is a recent example, underlining the unforeseeable nature of conflicts, but also showing the need for modern systems and facilities, and for less reliance on the United States for costly advanced capabilities. In these crisis times,

⁶⁸ Volkskrant, <http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/3237112/2012/04/06/SP-voorstel-F-16-s-vervelend-voor-GroenLinks.dhtml> accessed on April 24 2012.

rebalancing defence spending between the European nations and the United States is more than ever a necessity. *The other Allies must reduce the gap with the United States by equipping themselves with capabilities that are deemed to be critical, deployable and sustainable, and must demonstrate political determination to achieve that goal.* There must be equitable sharing of the defence burden. Smart defence is NATO's response to this. ... *With budgets under pressure, nations make unilateral decisions to abandon certain capabilities. When that happens the other nations fall under an increased obligation to maintain those capabilities.* Such specialization "by default" is the inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts. NATO should encourage specialization "by design" so that members concentrate on their national strengths and agree to coordinate planned defence budget cuts with the Allies, while maintaining national sovereignty for their final decision. ... *Acting together, the nations can have access to capabilities which they could not afford individually, and achieve economies of scale. Cooperation may take different forms, such as a small group of nations led by a framework nation, or strategic sharing by those who are close in terms of geography, culture or common equipment.* [emphasis added]⁶⁹

Conclusion

The Dutch case demonstrates one of the pitfalls of jointness. If the contextual factors in which jointness operates are not evenly influential to its functioning then the dominating context is likely to push jointness beyond the point of diminishing returns. In the Dutch situation the political context dominates the functioning of jointness, emphasizing its efficiency or rather its cost-effectiveness aspect. The influence of the strategic and operational context, which would normally counterweigh efficiency with the need to address the threat environment and assure operational effectiveness, is too little to effectively counterbalance the influence from the political context. The Dutch case study demonstrates that the pursuit of efficiency did enable the Dutch Armed Forces in the short-term to transform from a large, continental standing army that was defensive in orientation into a flexible, expeditionary organization. In the pursuit of jointness in the name of cost-effectiveness, however, the Dutch Armed Forces were not able to consolidate their transformation as other budget demands necessitated doing more with

⁶⁹ NATO, Smart Defence, Smart Defence http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-693EC3EC-D1067940/natolive/topics_84268.htm.

less. Eventually, jointness lost its utility for the Dutch Armed Forces and the pursuit of cost-effectiveness became an end in and of itself. The Netherlands is not alone in falling into the trap of pursuing jointness as a means to achieve cost savings through efficiencies.

All military budgets are decreasing in Europe and the capabilities of the armed forces of many countries are waning. Some analysts and policy makers have concluded that national specialization, and regional and international cooperation and integration are the only feasible way to maintain Europe as a viable military power and a relevant partner for NATO, which will be one of the key topics for the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago. The dominant political contexts in which such calculations are made does not offer much hope, as international cooperation and integration inevitably will be seen as new opportunities to decrease expenditure. Only if the strategic context grows in importance in terms of its influence on jointness, such as when the US reorients its national security interests away from Europe towards Asia, that a more balanced approach towards developing a European military structure will be possible, and NATO's *Smart Defense Concept* may be one of the ways to achieve this end.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Advisory Counsel on International Affairs, *Sovereignty and the Capacity to Act*, advisory report no. 78 (The Hague, January 2012), 41.

CONCLUSION

In military affairs, efficiency and effectiveness are often at odds.
- Thomas Donnelly

Jointness, the cooperative arrangements involving two or more different service entities within a military organization, holds the promise of significant military advantage. Cooperative arrangements allow efficient organization of the military while also capitalizing on complementary capabilities and strengths of the different armed services. Efficient organization and complementary capabilities increase the overall effectiveness of the armed forces. While the distinctly different military domains once allowed the services to fight independently and cooperate only when the battle took place where two domains would meet, the cross-domain capabilities of the services now have made cooperation a necessity. Cooperation is also necessary for limiting the cost of military operations. The rising costs of military technology have to compete domestically with social programs that burden the national treasure. Jointness therefore is not only a necessity in modern armed conflict but also is instrumental in making the armed forces more efficient. The idea of both effectiveness and efficiency springing from the same concept is intriguing. Efficiency and effectiveness are often at odds. A concept, which holds the promise of producing both, almost immediately raises suspicions among pragmatists.

This thesis investigated the concept of jointness from the starting premise that without a proper balance between efficiency and effectiveness, the concept of jointness will produce unintended effects leading to diminish its returns and ultimately to the detriment of the military organization. We need therefore to better understand the concept of jointness and its working to avoid negative consequences in its implementation. The case studies in this thesis demonstrate that the negative consequences of jointness may have a high price tag indeed. The Canadian Armed Forces that embarked on the joint experiment more than forty years ago are still recovering from its failure. The U.S. Armed Forces, although the world's most capable military forces, has been unable to leverage promised efficiencies jointness and control its expenditure which is now leading to Hobbesian choices in future defense budgets.

The U.S. experience of jointness pursued too much for effectiveness stands in contrast to the experience of the Dutch Armed Forces. The Dutch, in seeking to capitalize too much on efficiency aspects of jointness, are in danger of following the Canadian experience of becoming a hollow force. With the increasing costs of public services necessitating governments to control their expenditure and cut defense budgets, jointness has become instrumental in meeting the challenge of maintaining capable and credible armed forces as an instrument for foreign policy and national security. Without a proper understanding of the concept of jointness and its limitations this course of action, cuts will be made by politicians seeking the fiscal bottom line in the name of jointness.

To answer the primary question of this thesis, the concept of jointness was analyzed with the intent to identify its nature. With its nature identified this thesis then developed a theoretical framework for the investigation of jointness in practice. This theoretical framework was applied to three case studies of jointness, which were chosen for the extreme and very different aspects and outcomes the concept of jointness produced in each case. Within each case study, the theoretical framework helped to explain why and how jointness produced the particular outcome, providing evidence for the premise that the without maintaining a proper balance between its two purposes, jointness will not deliver on its promises. This chapter summarizes the overall findings and revisits the theoretical framework and findings of the case studies to offer some final thoughts and recommendations.

Armed services are not naturally inclined to cooperate with one another, which means its enforcement is necessary. This enforcement contributes to the contentiousness and competition between the armed services. Contention and competition were identified as an important characteristic of the concept of jointness. Competition is inevitable between the armed serves and is indispensable for the functioning of the armed forces as a whole. The strategic environment is not joint, which is the reason we have specialized services for each geographical war-fighting domain. The world is divided in distinctly different geographic domains in which strategies have to be executed. To develop such strategies requires knowledge of and specialization for each domain in which the objectives of strategy and policy must be attained. Jointness therefore needs to reconcile the necessity for diversity with the necessity of cooperation. Removing contention from

jointness is possible theoretically by forcing cooperation to its extreme end and merging the services into one single organization as was attempted with the Canadian Unification. Without honoring the necessity for diversity, however, the concept of jointness cannot properly function and ultimately becomes corrupted. Contention and competition therefore is an inevitable part of the nature of jointness. The case study of the Canadian Unification demonstrated the detrimental effects of pursuing jointness against its nature.

The investigation into the nature of jointness identified its four constituent characteristics. First, jointness is an inherently political act. The military is a political instrument and its organization reflects political choice and ambition. The jointness of the armed forces is a political choice, imposed on the military to enforce cooperation and increase its value. Enforcement is the second characteristic, as the natural resistance of the services needs to be overcome to allow jointness to function. This enforcement contributes to the third characteristic, contention between the services, which give rise to competitive ideas which are essential for the functioning of the armed forces as a whole. This paradox between enforcing cooperation while preserving competition lies at the heart of the concept of jointness. The fourth characteristic of jointness is its human dependence. Jointness rests on the willingness and ability of people to work together. Working together requires mutual understanding but also mutual respect for capabilities and perspectives. Trying to achieve jointness without addressing its human dimension is therefore doomed to fail.

The ultimate point of jointness is to enforce cooperation between armed services to increase the value of the armed forces to policy makers. This value, however, is context dependent. The contexts influential to the functioning of jointness were identified as the strategic, the political, and the operational. Strategically the value of the armed forces is its ability to address the challenges presented by the strategic environment. This requires strategic flexibility, which is identified as one function to which jointness is meant to contribute. Politically the value of the armed forces lies in their political utility, the options they can provide policymakers within the limitation of its means and in close connection to political ambitions. Jointness increases political utility as it contributes to maximizing the “bang for the buck.” Operationally the value of the armed forces is in its ability to achieve its operational objectives. Within the

operational context, the function of jointness is to produce a decisive operational advantage.

The different functions of jointness emphasize either effectiveness or efficiency, which can be achieved through a degree of cooperation. This points us to the theoretical boundaries of the concept of jointness. Within the concept effectiveness and efficiency are in polar opposition. Maximizing both requires a careful balance. If this balance is not maintained the benefit for the one will become the detriment for the other as is demonstrated in the case studies of the American and Dutch Armed Forces. The emphasis of the Dutch on efficiency has almost brought the armed forces to their knees. The American emphasis on effectiveness requires a level of expenditure which is ultimately unsustainable. Both cases reflect pursuit of jointness that is fundamentally instable and unbalanced. The balance between effectiveness and efficiency is reflected in the level of cooperation between the services. The degree of cooperation is a spectrum between two extremes with total independence (no cooperation) on one side, and total integration or merger on the other. The required degree of cooperation depends on which functions of jointness it primarily needs to support. The purpose of jointness therefore drives its functioning and the effects it produces. This relationship between purpose and functioning provides the foundation of the analytical framework.

The analysis identified that the different contexts—strategic, political, and operational—each provide a rationale for jointness that emphasizes either efficiency or effectiveness. The question then becomes which context is dominant in determining how jointness is pursued. The different contexts can therefore serve as the basis for a framework for the investigation of jointness in practice and an explanation of its results. The three case studies to which the framework was applied confirmed its utility.

All three case studies demonstrate how political leaders used jointness as a mechanism for change in the military organizations. The case studies also indicate how political emphasis influences the functioning of jointness either allowing the concept to function by respecting its paradoxical character or corrupting it through ignorance. The Canadian case study demonstrated how the net effect of Hellyer's faith in unification led him to turn a blind eye to the eventual consequences and outcome of the experiment as well as to ignore the true needs of the military. He pushed the concept beyond tolerable

or achievable organizational limits to the detriment of the Canadian Forces. The American case study demonstrates how the architects behind the Goldwater-Nichols Act understood the concept of jointness but the strategic and political context did not allow for experimentation and necessitated an approach of balancing service and joint interests. The drafters of the Act recognized the need to diminish the influence of service parochialism and expected an increase of jointness in return. The U.S. political system with its system of checks and balances can either make or break striking a balance between effectiveness and efficiency. Individual members of Congress often put their constituency's vested interests in defense acquisition ahead of the national need to control military expenditures. Redundancies, duplication, and inefficient use of resources are therefore likely to continue to exist in the American system. To continue to advocate jointness as a means of increasing operational effectiveness without capitalizing on efficiencies makes the exercise of jointness pointless. The Dutch case study demonstrated how, under the pressure of continuous budget cuts, the pursuit of efficiency did enable the Dutch Armed Forces to transform from a large continental defense force into a flexible expeditionary one. The Dutch Armed Forces, however, were unable to consolidate their transformation as the pursuit of even greater efficiencies demanding that they do more with less. Jointness therefore lost its utility for the Dutch Armed Forces and has become a form of political shorthand for "budget cuts."

The political context is the dominant one in the pursuit of jointness. Its natural emphasis on efficiency will stress efficiency at the cost of military effectiveness unless the strategic and operational contexts are sufficiently compelling politically. The Dutch case suggested that the contemporary strategic context is too irrelevant for Dutch politicians to consider, while the operational context is ignored or obscured within the military by a façade of rhetoric and wishful thinking. In contrast, the strategic and operational contexts exerted a huge influence on the American pursuit of jointness. The necessity of U.S. Armed Forces to be able to address the challenges of the strategic environment and be decisive in every battle has provided the individual armed services with political leverage, which has allowed them to avoid unwanted efficiency measures. In the Canadian case study, the strategic and operational contexts could not counterbalance Hellyer's ambition as he cleverly incorporated them in his justification

for unification. All three cases confirm the thesis that the function of jointness, whether it is political, military, or economic in nature, determines the mechanisms through which jointness is implemented. The results from the case studies also confirmed the premise that without maintaining a balance between its functions the pursuit of jointness will inevitably lead to diminishing returns. This brings us to the most important conclusion of this investigation into jointness.

The less a country uses its military instrument of power, the greater that country will emphasize its cost and the less attention its leaders will place on the consequences of continuous reorganizations or the emphasis on strategy and policy. The security emphasis is shifting more towards domestic issues and internal security forces and less to the military in such countries, although the military is still regarded as a coercive instrument for foreign policy. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Thomas Schelling writes, “To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated and it has to be avoidable by accommodation ... The power to hurt is bargaining power.”¹ Schelling goes on to add that “Brute force can only accomplish what requires no collaboration.”² This emphasis on the utility of force as a coercive instrument is important for the discussion of jointness. A greater preference for national defense and hard power diplomacy will place less emphasis on cost while less emphasis on security, and a preference for soft power foreign policy options, will put cost at the center of calculations concerning jointness. This conclusion informs us on an approach to the problem of balancing the concept of jointness.

The effects of jointness are not evident. The apparent simplicity of the concept lends itself towards easy assumptions of causality regarding cooperation. However the relationship between jointness and its ultimate instrumental purpose adds a higher degree of complexity to understanding it. The most important question to answer before pursuing jointness is “for what ultimate purpose are we seeking jointness?” The framework offered in this thesis would allow decision makers to identify the dominant rationale behind jointness but also consider the other contexts process. Such an inquiry

¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 2-3.

² Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 8.

should naturally lead to other questions, which include: Will the purpose sought after emphasize efficiency of effectiveness? Does the strategic, political and operational context allow for overemphasizing or do they provide sufficient counterweight? Such questions contribute to an assessment of the risks associated with pursuing jointness single-mindedly. These risks inform the policymaker on the guidance necessary for implementing jointness to prevent unintended (the Dutch case) or unwanted (the American case) effects. It is doubtful, however, whether this approach would have prevented the Dutch from seeking to “punching above their weight” while simultaneously cutting costs or the Americans from spending at levels that have been unsustainable for some time in the pursuit of military effectiveness and domain dominance. The inherently political nature of jointness places its control and responsibility ultimately in the hands of the statesman. In his seminal work on civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington wisely counseled, “The Statesman furnishes the dynamic, positive element to state policy. The military man represents the passive, instrumental means. It is his function to warn the statesman when his purposes are beyond his means”³ As this thesis has pointed out repeatedly, the statesman must be willing to listen.

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 68-69.

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ACRONYMS

AIV-Advisory Council on International Affairs
CAS-Close Air Support
CDS-Commander Armed Forces
CFHQ-Canadian Forces Head Quarters
COCOM-Combatant Commander
CF-Canadian Forces
DoD-Department of Defense
ICC-International Criminal Court
ICJ-International Court of Justice
ICTY-The Yugoslavia Tribunal
ISAF-International Security Assistance Force
JCS-Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM-Joint Forces Command
JSPD-Joint Strategic Planning Document
KL-Koninklijke Landmacht (Army)
KLu-Koninklijke Luchtmacht (Air Force)
KM-Koninklijke Marine (Navy)
KMar-Koninklijke Marechaussee (Military Constabulary)
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHQ-National Defense Head Quarters (Canadian)
NORAD-North American Aerospace Defense Command
NSSR-National Security Strategy Report
OPCW-Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE-Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PPBS-Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
RCN-Royal Canadian Navy
RCA-Royal Canadian Army
RCAF-Royal Canadian Air Force
SAC-Strategic Air Command

AU/SAASS/BRUNSTING/AY12

UAV-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN-United Nations

USAF-United States Air Force



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